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Introduction
In the summer of 1997, as the first aggressive steps by the international
community in Bosnia were being enacted, Jamie F. Metzl proposed that an
"information intervention unit" be created within the United Nations.1
The international community could use the information intervention unit
to respond to broadcasting efforts that might be used to "incite widespread
violence in crisis zones."2 Such a unit would have, in Metzl's proposal,
three primary functions: "monitoring, peace broadcasting, and, in extreme
* Joseph and Sadie Danciger Professor of Law, Howard M. Squadron Program in
Law, Media and Society, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; co-director, Programme in
Comparative Media Law and Policy, University of Oxford. This study was written while
I was a Fellow of the Media Studies Center in New York. Stacy Sullivan, who had been a
reporter in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributed very substantially to the work due both to
her experience and her excellence as a writer. Joseph Perkovich, Eric Blinderman, and
Kevin Deborde provided significant research support.
1. Jamie F. Metzl, Information Intervention: When Switching Channels Isn't Enough,
FORMGN AFAiRS, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 15.
2. Id. at 15, 17.
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cases, jamming radio and television broadcasts." 3 Metzl pointed to the
explosive mobilizing role Radio Milles Collines had in Rwanda with its rep-
etitious and explicit incitement for Hutu to slaughter Tutsi as one example
where preventive intervention by the international community would have
been suitable.4 Metzl saw the techniques of information intervention as a
way to broaden the range of intermediary opportunities available to the
United Nations, NATO, or the United States during peacekeeping measures
in ethnic and other conflicts. 5 "The world community's failure to halt the
genocide in Rwanda," Metzl concluded, "exposed the weakness of an inter-
national system that forces states to choose between the extremes of mas-
sive, armed humanitarian intervention and mere symbolic action.... The
time has come to develop, refine, and institutionalize information-based
responses to incendiary mass communications." 6
For more than six months in late 1997 and early 1998, the NATO Sta-
bilization Force (Sfor), under orders from the Office of the High Represen-
tative (OHR), controlled key broadcast transmitters for "security
protection." 7 Sfor's seizure of the transmitters was said to be necessary to
ensure that information transmitted to Bosnian Serbs met the objectives of
the Dayton Accords.8
The active, directed, and explicit intervention in Bosnia raises to a new
level the international debate about the appropriate role of media policy in
preventing ethnic conflict and preserving peace-keeping processes. Bosnia-
Herz. illustrates the full range of possible foreign assistance used to remold
an indigenous media, from professional training to dosing down of sta-
tions, all to improve the role of the information space in assuring a more
democratic society. Bosnia-Herzegovina may be an exceptional case in the
relationship between media and foreign policy. Examining the implemen-
tation of the Dayton Accords, however, is instructive for understanding
approaches-especially in the most difficult of circumstances - by which
the United States and the international community make decisions con-
cerning the relationship between broadcasting and foreign policy. Bosnia
provides a window into the debate over multilateral interventions justified
in the name of obtaining objectivity and impartiality, avoiding ethnic con-
flict, and enhancing the right to receive and impart information.
There is growing recognition that threats to peace and to the interna-
tional order now arise most often in bitter conflicts where words become
3. Id. at 17.
4. See id. at 15-16 ("[S]imply jamming Hutu broadcasts and replacing them with
messages of peace and reconciliation would have had a significant impact on the course
of events.").
5. See id.
6. Id. at 16.
7. Statement by the Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana, Presswire, Oct. 1, 1997,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, PRNEWS File.
8. Sfor controlled the transmitters from Oct. 1, 1997 until April 14, 1998. See Serbs
and Sfor Agree Return of TV Transmitters, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 17,
1998, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File; see also Statement by the Secre-
tary General, Dr. Javier Solana, supra note 7.
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the prelude to slaughter. After actual conflict begins, military strategies are
rendered far more complex due to inflamed emotions intensified by the
tactical use of radio and television.9 In a time of difficult and novel
"peacekeeping" operations, disarming the media space has become a fac-
tor. It is against this background that the practices in Bosnia, demonstrat-
ing the complexities of refashioning a media and information space,
become important to study.
In this Article, I focus on NATO's media policy during the first stages
of its administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In particular, I examine the
implementation of the Dayton Accords for instruction in understanding
approaches that the United States and the international community make
concerning the relationship between broadcasting and foreign policy. I
describe NATO's media policy in Bosia-Herzegovina, with special empha-
sis on the Bosnian Serb sector of Republika Srpska, and the seizure and
control of broadcast transmitters there.
Part I of this Article provides a background on the role of the media in
Bosnia, from the pre-war period through NATO's seizure of transmitters in
Republika Srpska and post-seizure details. Part 11 explains the legal basis
for information intervention. Part III covers the concept of information
intervention at work in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, the Conclusion offers
a number of questions to consider while studying media and foreign
policy.
1. The Bosnian Example
A. Bosnian Television and the Role of the Media in the Bosnian War
Media was used to spread terror and fan the flames of war in the former
Yugoslavia.' 0 Several months before anyone in the region outwardly bore
arms, nationalist leaders in the various Yugoslav republics began laying the
groundwork for war by planning media campaigns. For example, Serbian
President Slobodan Miosevic, who is widely blamed for waging and insti-
gating the war in Bosnia," sent paramilitary troops and technicians to
seize a dozen television transmitters in the northern and eastern parts of
Bosnia in the spring of 1992.12 These areas are close to Serbia and had
substantial Serb populations. As a result, more than half the people in the
9. See, e.g., PHILIP M. TAYLOR, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND
"me MEDIA SINCE-1945, at 132 (1997) (describing how the Bosnian government tactically
gave foreign journalists access to their civilian population in an effort to portray them-
selves as victims of aggression).
10. See, e.g., Metzl, supra note 1, at 17. See also Blaine Harden, Serbiah Bid For Bos-
nia Alleged: Campaign Said to Target Areas of Newly Independent State, WASH. POST, Apr.
11, 1992, at A13; Lisa Schmandt, Comment: Peace With Justice: Is It Possible for the
Former Yugoslavia?, 30 Tax. INT'L L.J. 335 (1995); Maj. MichaelJ. Berrigan, Book Review:
The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 151 MIL. L. Rev. 282 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Warren Zimmerman, A Baby Face and Cold Heart, Nevswemc, Apr. 19,
1999, at 31; Henry Kamm, Yugoslavs Astir Over Serbian's Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1989,
at 12.
12. See, e.g., Fighting Around Mt. Vlasic Transmitter Sarajevo TV-Radio Asks for Relays
Back (Radio Slovenia broadcast May 1, 1992) (available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 33
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina began receiving the television signal con-
trolled by Belgrade rather than the usual television from Sarajevo.' 3 The
idea of a unified Bosnia information space, with a national signal emanat-
ing from Sarajevo, was immediately fractured, and the stage was set to
wage a fierce propaganda war that would precede any actual fighting.
With the airwaves firmly in his hands both in Serbia and in more than
half of Bosnia, Milosevic broadcast fictitious reports that Serbs in Croatia
and Bosnia were being massacred by Croat militiamen who drained the
blood of Serb civilians before murdering them and that the main Muslim
political party in Bosnia executed five of its own members for leaking word
of a genocidal conspiracy against Serbs in the town of Bosanski Samac. 14
The propaganda countered the fact that Muslims, Serbs and Croats had co-
existed side by side for nearly fifty years in Yugoslavia, particularly in Bos-
nia where there was a substantial intermarriage rate. 15 But the majority of
Serbs seemed to embrace the propaganda. There are varying interpreta-
tions for the reasons why, including historic ethnic divides arising out of
the two World Wars 16 and the fact that Yugoslavia was a country whose
media had always been controlled by the state.17 The false reports were
laden with Serb symbolism and historical references to Serb struggles
against Ottoman Turks and the Bosnian Muslims who cooperated with
them, and German Nazis and the Croat fascists who cooperated with them.
The emotional appeal of Serbian struggle was so strong that questioning
the truthfulness of the news reports was almost akin to betraying Serb cul-
ture. Some independent journalists in Belgrade wrote about the pernicious
and dangerous potential of Milosevic-controlled television, but their publi-
cations did not have mass readership and hardly made a dent in combating
the powerful nationalist television. 18 The nationalist and inflammatory
propaganda struck fear into the Serb population. When Belgrade television
encouraged Serbs to arm themselves against the "enemies of the Serb peo-
ple," most Serbs in both Bosnia and Croatia did as they were told.
The Serbs were not the only ones who understood that the key to
power and influence was television. Well before any fighting began in Bos-
nia, Croatian television was airing nationalist broadcasts warning that the
Serbs intended to exterminate the Croat population in order to form a
BBCSWB File); Michael Montgomery, Bosnia's Leader Appeals For Help From EC, DAILY
TELEGRPH, Apr. 11, 1992, at 11.
13. See, e.g., Fighting Around Mt. Vlasic Transmitter Sarajevo TV-Radio Asks for Relays
Back, supra note 12.
14. See Blaine Harden, The Enemy Around Us: A Serb View, State Media, Age-Old
Traditions Fuel Sense of Victimization, WASH. Posr, May 7, 1992, at A33.
15. See Remy Ourdan, The End of a Dream: Vision of a Multi-Cultural Bosnia-Herzego-
vina Fades, 42 WoRLD PREss REV. 29 (Jan. 1995).
16. See Ivo John Lederer, Bosnia: Precedents of Peace, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 1997, at
C7.
17. See Jill Smolowe, Why Do They Keep on Killing?, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 48; see
also Cedric Thornberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal, 104 FORMGN POLicY 72 (Sept.
1996).
18. See, e.g., Gordana Logar, Light That Refused To Go Out, THE GuARDIAN (London),
Aug. 7, 1995, at T13.
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"Greater Serbia." 19 These incendiary programs suggested to Croats that
they were in mortal danger from the Serbs and that they should arm them-
selves before it was too late.20
Bosnian television in Sarajevo did not broadcast a similar degree of
propaganda and incendiary remarks. It took a more conciliatory tone,
reporting on and emphasizing efforts being made to diffuse crisis. It con-
tradicted predictions heard on Serbian and Croatian broadcasts that war
was inevitable. In spite of this more even-handed approach, the Sarajevo
government already knew that war, were it to occur, would be driven by
television. Bosnian leaders begged U.S. officials at the U.S. embassy in Bel-
grade to jam Serbian television broadcasts. 21 Both Serb and Croat televi-
sion broadcasts incited the population to war, and throughout four years of
fighting, nationalist programs continued to play a role in spreading the
propaganda and hatred that fanned the war's flames.
In early 1992, the Bosnian Serb leadership left Sarajevo. Soon thereaf-
ter, the village of Pale became their self-styled capital.22 Almost immedi-
ately, in April 1992, they began broadcasting their own television channel,
Serb Radio and Television (SRT). 23 Firmly under the control of the nation-
alist leaders who would lead the war, SRT used the same tactics that Bel-
grade television had used before the war. Falsified reports of Serbs being
slaughtered by Islamic fundamentalists and Croatian fascists (Ustashe)
were the norm, as were false reports about Western conspiracies against
the Serb nation.24 Regardless of the content of the broadcasts, they were
successful in stirring up hatred against Muslims and Croats. SRT also gave
ample coverage to Serbs who had been killed by Croats allied with the
Nazis during World War II. Ordinary Serbs came to believe that the
"Turks" and the "Ustashe" were waging a war of aggression and that the
Serbs needed to fight for the survival of their nation. They became con-
vinced that if they did not begin "cleansing" Muslims and Croats from
"their territory," the Muslims and Croats would harm them.25
During the first year of the war, the Muslims and Croats were allied
together against the Serbs. However, after the Serbs were pushed back
19. See Krajina Serbs Appeal to Diplomats in Belgrade to Stop Croatian Aggression,
Tanjug News Agency, Sept. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB
File.
20. See Andrej Gustincic, Bosnia's Ethnic Leaders Fear Bloodbath If War Erupts,
Reuters North American Wire, Sept. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
REUNA File.
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Pale: From Sports Resort to War Headquarters, AGENcE FRANcE PRaSSE,
May 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, AFP file.
23. Bosnian Media Guide: A Guide To Selected Sources Covering Bosnia, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, June 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB
File.
24. See, e.g., Milosevic's and Other Serb Leaders' "Hypocrisy" Condemned in Radio
Commentary (Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina broadcast, Oct. 18, 1993), available in LEXIS,
ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. See also Poison from Pale, TIMEs (London), Aug. 25,
1997, Features.
25. See Poison from Pale, supra note 24.
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from Croat territory in 1993, the Croats turned against their former Mus-
lim allies. Again, television played a key role. The Croats, like the Serbs,
wanted to carve out a piece of Bosnia for themselves to create a "Greater
Croatia."2 6 Croatian television from Zagreb began broadcasting reports
claiming that Islamic fundamentalists were trying to create a state where
Catholic Croats would be oppressed and subjugated. 27 The broadcasts
portrayed Muslims as dirty, anti-Christians, who were intent on depriving
the Catholics of their religion and heritage. 28 The strategy encouraged a
sufficient number of Croats to fight against their Muslim neighbors.
Independent voices existed, taking views contrary to the official per-
spective, but they were routinely harassed, mostly unread or unheard, and
did little to change public opinion. In Serbia, the radio station B-92 boldly
criticized President Milosevic and opposed the war efforts. As a result, its
editors were routinely harassed and its signals were frequently jammed.2 9
While B-92 received critical praise in international circles, its broadcasting
frequency only reached a small radius within Belgrade and its program-
ming was ineffective in changing Serbian public opinion both during and
after the war. Several Serbian independent newspapers and magazines,
highly critical of the Serbian actions, were available throughout the war.30
They painted an accurate portrait of the "ethnic cleansing" and fighting
that was taking place in neighboring Bosnia, but they were read only by a
small group of intellectuals and had almost no impact in changing public
opinion. In neighboring Serb-controlled Bosnia, there were several
independent newspapers that came out sporadically, but their journalists
were harassed, jailed, and even killed, and some of their offices were
bombed.3 1 None successfully challenged the reach and effectiveness of the
Bosnian Serb television station SRT.
26. See Charles Lane & Tom Post, Bosnia: An Unholy Alliance, NEWSWEEK, July 12,
1993, at 33.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Robert Block, Muslim Refugees Grow Uneasy in Croatia, THE INDEPEND-
ENT (London), June 18, 1993, at 12
29. See, e.g., Anti-Milosevic Protest Rolls On, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 29, 1993;
Michael J. Jordan, Alternative Stations Breaking State Media Control in Serbia, PRAGUE
POST, Aug. 27, 1997, at News; Colin McIntyre, Serbia's Independent Media Battle Poverty,
Apathy, Reuters North American Wire, Sept. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD
Library, REUNA File. Jamming is a shorthand definition that encompasses a variety of
external tools that preclude a transmission from reaching its intended audience. Jam-
ming has been defined as "the deliberate use of interfering radio signals sent from one or
more transmitters to garble emissions from other transmitters in order to make them
unintelligible at reception." JOHN B. WHITTON & ARTHUR D. LIARSON4, PROPAGANDA
TOWARDS DisARMAMrN IN THE WAR of WORDS 210 (1964).
30. For example, Republika was published fortnightly out of Belgrade, the main
Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje was independent, and Vreme was published weekly in Bel-
grade. See Balkan Media and Policy Monitor (visted Jan. 20, 2000) <http://
MediaFilter.org/mff/Monldx.html>. The Balkan Media and Policy Monitor is a service
from MediaFilter.Org, which gives a periodic analysis of independent media in the
Balkans.
31. See, e.g., Poison in Serbia, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 19, 1999, at 6. See also
Peter Galliner, Dashed Hopes for the Press, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Feb. 1993, Vol. 40, No.
Vol. 33
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In Croatia, the Feral Tribune, a newspaper that satirically criticized
the Croatian government and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's nation-
alist policies, was printed weekly during the war. However, its editors were
routinely brought to trial.32 Croatia's independent Radio 101 was also crit-
ical of the government and opposed the war efforts. Not surprisingly, the
government tried to revoke its broadcasting license. 33 Only a massive pro-
test and international appeals from press and human rights groups kept
Radio 101 on the air.34 In Hercog-Bosna, the Croat-controlled section of
Bosnia, there was virtually no alternative press. The options were Croatian
TV (HRT), Mostar TV, which was even more nationalistic and provocative
than HRT, Radio Mostar, and newspapers loyal to the ruling Croatian Dem-
ocratic Party (HDZ).
Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television (RTBiH) remained as it was
prior to the war. Its reporting was fairly accurate and truthful. It did not
spread anti-Serb nor anti-Croat propaganda, but it did report facts about
the war. It neither exaggerated nor underplayed the atrocities committed
by the Serbs and Croats, nor the number of number of dead each day in
Sarajevo. Moreover, there were two independent television stations, Studio
99 and Hayat in Sarajevo, as well as several independent radio stations,
notably Radio Zid and Radio Tuzla in Sarajevo. All were at times critical of
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic's policies. 35 Oslobodjenje, famous
around the world for continuing to print even during the worst days of
Sarajevo's siege, was less critical of the Bosnian leadership than several
other independent newspapers that published throughout the war.
B. The Dayton Accords
The war in Bosnia, a brutal combination of psychological manipulation
and physical violence, ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement (the
"Accords" or the "Dayton Accords"). 36 By the summer of 1995, the United
Nations mission to Bosnia was falling apart. Bosnian Serb leaders increas-
2, at 10 (number of journalists killed far outstrips media casualties in any other conflict
of recent times).
32. The editors were accused, among other charges, of criminal libel against
Tudjman. See, e.g., Croatian Satirical Magazine Protests At "Persecution" of Journalists,
HINA News Agency, Oct. 31, 1998, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File;
Croatia Rejects Claim Editor's Arrest Was Illegal, Reuters World Service, Jan. 7, 1994,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. A U.S. State Department dispatch
covering human rights in Croatia in 1993 confirmed that "the International Federation
of Journalists in March [1993] suggested that Croatia's admission to the Council of
Europe should be delayed because it was 'very concerned' about freedom of the press in
Croatia." Fresh Croatian Media Trial Opens, AGENcE FRANCE PRmSsE, Dec. 22, 1997.
33. See Radio 101 Views Its License Situation (Independent Croatian Radio broadcast,
Jan. 24, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
34. See id. See also Croatia Extends License of Independent Zagreb Radio, RuTEm
WORLD SERvicE, Jan. 9, 1997.
35. See, e.g., Muslims Criticize Sarajevo for "Abandoning" Mostar, Tanjug News
Agency, May 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File; Kati Marton,
Key to the Balkans: A Free Press, WASH. PosT, May 31, 1996, at A23.
36. The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. See
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec.
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ingly used tactics such as taking U.N. peacekeepers hostage and holding
up U.N. aid convoys.3 7 The Europeans threatened to withdraw their forces,
effectively closing down the U.N. mission.38 Months earlier, U.S. President
Bill Clinton had agreed to commit American troops to assist with a U.N.
pull-out from Bosnia. Faced with that disastrous scenario he dispatched
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, a seasoned diplomat, to
negotiate a peace settlement.39
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman came to Dayton, Ohio,
where diplomats hammered out a peace settlement to end the war. The
diplomats worked through the nights designing treaty boundaries accepta-
ble to all parties and drawing the lines on the map. It was finally agreed
that Bosnia would remain one country, but divided into two entities:
Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation.4° That structure sat-
isfied the Serbs because they were, in a sense, given the "republic" for
which they were fighting, even though Republika Srpska is an "entity," not
an independent state. The agreement satisfied the Muslims because it, in a
sense, kept Bosnia whole. It offered little to the Croats, except that, as part
of the Muslim-Croat Federation, they were able to form special ties with
neighboring Croatia.
The military component of the Dayton Accords took weeks to plan and
was stated in great detail. The Clinton Administration's main aim was to
end the fighting in Bosnia, so special care was given toward that goal.
Deadlines were set for the release of political prisoners,41 for the separation
of military forces,42 and for weapons from all three armies to be put into
barracks or destroyed.43 The Accords called for heavily armed NATO
troops, with a strong mandate to retaliate against any kind of attack against
them, to be deployed for at least a year to enforce the military agreement. 44
The civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords were not prepared with the
same attention to detail as the military component. The Accords stipulated
that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
would organize elections;45 that the United Nations would oversee creation
of an unarmed civilian police force to oversee the police forces in each
14, 1995, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (1995), 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton
Accords].
37. See U.S. Department of State, Dispatch, Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights
Practices 1995, Vol 7, Mar. 1996 (55 U.N. troops taken hostage in a single day); see also
Abba Eban, The U.N. Idea Revisited, FOREGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 1995, at 39.
38. See A Crisis of Conscience, ECONOMIST, July 22, 1995, at 15.
39. See Michael Dobbs, Three U.S. Diplomats Share Credit for Bosnia Deal, Ir'L HER-
ALD TIIBUNE, Nov. 23, 1995, at News.
40. A map detailing the division of Bosnia can be found at: Bosnia (visited on Apr.
25, 1999) <http://www.applicom.com/twibih/map.html>.
41. See Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex IA, art. IX.
42. See id. Annex IA, art. III.
43. See id. Annex 1A, art. IV.
44. See id. Annex IA, art. VI.
45. See id. Annex 3, art. I.
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entity;4 6 that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) would oversee the return or resettlement of displaced peoples or
refugees;4 7 and that a High Representative chosen by the Contact Group
would coordinate the activities of the different organizations.48 The aim of
these sections of the Accords was to reconstitute Bosnia's former multi-
ethnic nature and create a Bosnian national identity against a backdrop of
continuing ethnic hatred and loyalties.
The elections would be the international community's most crucial
task, as well as the most rigorous test of the Accords' future success.
Although the OSCE had never before staged an election, it was chosen to
oversee the elections because the United Nations was held in low repute in
the region.49 The Accords specified that the OSCE would set up a Provi-
sional Election Commission (PEC) to oversee elections at the federal,
entity, and municipal levels.5 0 The PEC was specifically empowered to
adopt electoral rules and regulations concerning the registration of polit-
ical parties, voter eligibility, international observers, and all other meas-
ures that "open and fair electoral campaigns" could take place.5 1 The
parties were required to obey the PEC rules stipulated in the Accords, as
well as any rules and regulations the PEC would create pursuant to the
agreement. 5 2
C. State of the Media After the Dayton Accords
The Dayton Accords were signed in Paris in December 1995 and immedi-
ately put into force. In addition to representatives from the United States,
the Russian Federation, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United King-
dom, and France, the Accords were signed by the internationally recog-
nized president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.5 3 The exclu-
sion of informally recognized Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaders
from the signing would later have consequences in terms of perceived obli-
46. See id. Annex 11, art. III (The International Police Task Force assistance program
is designed, among other things, to monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement activ-
ities and facilities.).
47. See id. Annex 7, art. I ("The Parties call upon the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to develop in dose consultation with asylum countries
and the Parties a repatriation plan that will allow for an early, peaceful, orderly and
phased return of refugees and displaced persons, which may include priorities for cer-
tain areas and certain categories of returnees.").
48. See id. Annex 10, art. I. For a more detailed look at the Office of the High Repre-
sentative (OHR), see Office of the High Representative (last modified Oct. 5, 1999) <http:/
/www.ohr.int./info/info.htm>.
49. See generally Christopher A. Riley, Neither Free Nor Fair: The 1996 Bosnian Elec-
tions and the Failure of the U.N. Election-Monitoring Mission, 30 VA.D. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1173, 1192-1200 (1997).
50. See Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex 3, art. II.
51. See id. Annex 3, art. III.
52. See id.
53. See id. General Framework Agreement. See also Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Frac-
tured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 MicH. J. Itrr'L L. 957, 998-
99 (1999).
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gations to honor the Accords. For these nationalist leaders, although the
fighting had been suspended, an underlying war was still underway. They
conducted their war through the media, creating the potential for pent-up
hostilities to explode into renewed conflict. To maintain control over their
territories, nationalist Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaders clung to
their party-controlled media. The Serb-held parts of Bosnia were still cov-
ered by broadcasts of the rabidly nationalist Serb Radio and Television
(SRT) and the Croat-held parts of Bosnia continued to receive broadcasts
from the rabidly nationalist Croatian Radio and Television (HRT). The
Bosniak-controlled part of the country remained under the coverage of
RTBiH.54
The three ethnic groups started vying for more effective use and con-
trol of the airwaves in their spheres of influence. Croats, Serbs, and Mus-
lims all repaired war-damaged television transmitters on mountains in their
respective territories, attempting to broadcast their frequencies as far and
wide as possible.55 The Serbian government in Belgrade set up a television
transmitter in Serbia near the border of the newly-created Republika Srp-
ska to broadcast Serbian television throughout the Serb-controlled entity.56
In addition, the Serbian government aided the Bosnian Serbs in repairing
war-damaged transmitters.5 7 The Croatian government added additional
transmitters in Croatia near the Bosnian border to broadcast Croatian tele-
vision into Bosnian territory and aided the Bosnian Croats in repairing
existing transmitters.5 8 The Croatian government also helped Bosnian
Croats add additional transmitters to increase the coverage of Bosnian
Croat television. 59 The Bosnian government received assistance from Nor-
way to renovate and repair some twenty-one television transmitters to
enhance the coverage of the multi-ethnic voice necessary to facilitate recon-
ciliation. 60 All parties in the war were clearly intent on continuing to
spread their wartime doctrines during the peace brought about by the
Accords.
54. Although RTBiH had become more nationalistic over time, it was not as national-
istic as SRT or HRT.
55. See, e.g., Foca Again Receiving Belgrade Television Signal, BORBA, Aug. 9, 1996,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File; Interview with Radovan Karadzic
(Bosnian Serb Television broadcast, May 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD
Library, BBCSWB File.
56. See Interview with Radovan Karadzic (Bosnian Serb Television broadcast, May 13,
1996), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
57. See id.
58. See Financial Plight of Radio-TV Bosnia-Hercegovina, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Aug. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File ("Although
the Washington Agreement was signed more than two years ago, we have not managed to
regain control of the transmitters in the territory controlled by the Croat Defense Coun-
cil [HVO - Bosnian Croat army]. These transmitters are being used today to broadcast
the programmes of Croatian Radio-TV." (brackets in original)).
59. See id.
60. See Norwegians Help Renovate TV Transmitters in Central Bosnia (TV Bosnia-
Hercegovina broadcast, June 20, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB
File.
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D. Dayton Implementation and the Media
Just days after the Dayton Accords were signed in Paris, Ambassador Robert
Frowick, the American who headed the OSCE mission in Bosnia, arrived in
Sarajevo to begin planning for the elections. 61 Aware of the media's role in
the war, and the role it would continue to play in peace, Frowick and the
other diplomats implementing the Dayton Accords realized that changing
the state of the partitioned and nationalistic media was crucial for unifying
the country. Because the Accords established a timetable for national elec-
tions to take place within six to fifteen months after the Accords were
signed, it was clear that a massive effort was required to foster a more plu-
ralistic press in Bosnia. Without this stronger multi-ethnic voice, Bosnians
- Muslims, Serbs and Croats - could be limited to information from their
respective fiercely nationalistic and separatist television programs. If alter-
native sources of information were not provided across the country, the
same nationalist leaders who waged the war and still controlled the air-
waves were likely to be voted back into power. For the elections to be a
success in terms of the Accords, the international community needed to
play a role in adjusting media practices to assure a fuller and freer debate
before the elections.
The organizations involved in implementing the peace plan called on
Bosnian politicians to soften their media's nationalist and provocative pro-
gramnming. The OSCE established a Media Experts Commission (MEG) as
a sub-commission to the PEC.62 The MEC issued a set of rules and regula-
tions the media was expected to follow that included "providing true and
accurate information," "refraining from broadcasting incendiary program-
ming," and running OSCE and international election-related statements
and advertisements. 63 It also ordered the three television systems con-
trolled by the ruling parties in Bosnia's entities to provide opposition polit-
ical parties with the same amount of advertising time as the ruling
nationalist parties. 64 It then set up a monitoring group that could write
citations for media violations of its rules and regulations. 65
In addition to establishing rules governing the existing media, the
OSCE helped finance a special broadcast network The Free Elections
Radio Network (FERN) was part of a project initially started by the Swiss
government to provide "objective and timely information on the elections"
to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina in all entities.66 The project envi-
sioned reaching seventy percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina well before the elec-
tions, with signals equally split between the Muslim-Croat Federation and
61. See Head of OSCE Mission Arrives in Sarajevo to Start Work, AGENCE FRa.ca
PR:ssE, Dec. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, AFP File.
62. See Bosnia and Herzegovina Elections Page (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://
www.oscebih.org/mec/mecexperts.htm>.
63. See MEC's Goals and Responsibilities (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://
www.oscebih.org/mec/mecexpert.htm>.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See OSCE to Launch Radio Network For Free Elections in Bosnia (Radio Hajat
broadcast, July 15, 1996), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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Republika Srpska.6 7 But the Bosnian Serb leadership claimed they could
not install the transmitters FERN needed because the roads leading to the
mountain installation sites were mined.68 The OSCE and the Swiss gov-
ernment did manage to get FERN on the air in Banja Luka, but within days,
the Serb authorities blocked its transmission.69 When FERN went on the
air in July 1996, only two months before the vote, it reached only forty
percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all within the Muslim-Croat
Federation.70 FERN thus had no impact in Republika Srpska, where the
population was most in need of alternative sources of information. 71 How-
ever, though FERN was created to influence the first elections, it remains
on the air in Bosnia-Herzegovina today.
E. Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Open Broadcast
Network (OBN)
Even before the creation of FERN, OHR proposed creating an independent
television network to provide balanced information prior to the elections. 72
The network's aim would be to provide all Bosnians with "unbiased infor-
mation" from both local and international journalists, as well as commer-
cial programs from around the world.73 The network came to be known as
the Open Broadcast Network (OBN). Until the Accords were finally signed
in January 1996, OBN remained in its conceptual stage, and it was not
until March 1996 that activity commenced to bring about the network.
Governments and NGOs committed to establishing the OBN included the
United States Information Agency (USIA), the European Union (EU), and
the Soros Foundation's Open Society Institute (OSI). 74
In April 1996, the OSI sent media experts to conduct a feasibility and
cost study.75 The experts determined that for OBN to be effective, it would
require an estimated $17.6 million.76 A donors' conference was held in
67. See International Crisis Group, Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Interna-
tional Support Can Be More Effective (Mar. 18, 1997) <http://www.crisisweb.org/
projects/bosnia/reports/bh2lmain.htm> (hereinafter ICG Media Report).
68. See id. See also Radio FERN Only Heard Within Federation, World Broadcast
Information, Sept. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
69. ICG Media Report, supra note 67; see also Radio FERN Only Heard Within Federa-
tion, supra note 68.
70. See ICG Media Report, supra note 67.
71. See id.
72. Civilian peace mediators working in advance of the Dayton Accords in Septem-
ber 1995 first proposed creating an independent network that could be used to combat
the party-controlled nationalist programming of Serb, Muslim and Croat television. See
Office of the High Representative, More Information about OBN (visited on Apr. 17,
1999) <http://www.ohr.int/obninfo.htrn,.
73. See Donors Discuss Development of TVIN Network, Oslobodjenje, Oct. 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File; see also More Information About
OBN, supra note 72.
74. See U.S. Troubled by Harassment of Special Bosnian Election Network, DEUTSCHE
PRESsE-AGENTEuR, Aug. 28, 1996. Of the EU countries, Sweden, Britain and Germany
were particularly involved in the creation of OBN. See Reprogramming a Country for
Peace, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 12, 1996, at 9.
75. See Reprogramming a Country for Peace, supra note 74.
76. See id.
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May 1996, at which $13.5 million was pledged, $4 million short of the
projected need.77 The project was reconfigured and reduced in scope.
Money came in slowly, making it increasingly unlikely that OBN would be
up and running in time to make a difference for the September elections.
However, the donors believed OBN could still have an impact on Bosnia-
Herzegovina for the future.
Other problems with the project soon arose. Each donor country
wanted its pledged money to go toward the purchase of specific pieces of
equipment, often of its own manufacture. The money arrived late, and it
often came with caveats. By August, just a month before the elections, OBN
was still not on the air and both the peace mediators and the donor nations
realized that the project's impact on the September elections would be
negligible.
The OHR, OSI, USIA, and the EU continued with the project, finally
creating a network of television stations that went on the air a few days
before the election.78 Only a handful of stations, all but one in the Muslim-
Croat Federation, agreed to be a part of the OBN.7 9 Only an estimated
one-third of the Bosnian population could see it, with no coverage in
Republika Srpska.80 Further, for its debut, the opening credits were writ-
ten on a piece of paper, crookedly held by a pair of visible hands.
FERN and OBN were not successful in their goal of creating a more
pluralistic media across Bosnia-Herzegovina before the elections. Neither
were other attempts to alter the media environment. UNESCO established
a program bank in Sarajevo. It asked European countries to donate some
of their national broadcasting about history, arts, and culture.81 These
programs would be broadcast on television stations across Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, helping to improve content and to avoid piracy. However, the effort
had little success in producing more balanced broadcasts from the televi-
sion stations. NATO troops also made an effort to spread alternative infor-
mation. They created their own radio station, Radio Mir, or Peace Radio. 82
USAID sponsored election advertisements that called on Bosnians in every
entity to utilize their right to vote to ensure "peace, democracy and the
future of their country."83 The OSCE ordered all three party-controlled tel-
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See TVIN Reportedly Not Meeting Initial Expectations, Vjesnik, Sept. 13, 1996,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. The stations were: Hayat and Stu-
dio 99, both independent stations in Sarajevo; HRT in Mostar; Zetel, an independent
station in Zenica; and TVTUZ, a public station in Tuzla.
80. See id.
81. See YLE Supporting UNESCO's Bosnia Programme Bank (Radio Finland broadcast,
Nov. 24, 1996), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. For example, Fin-
land quickly donated 40 hours of Finnish films about the beauties of Nordic summers,
the Finnish archipelago, and reindeer round-ups which were aired on BiHTV in
Sarajevo.
82. See International Forces Station, Radio Mir, Goes On Air, BH Press News Agency,
Jan. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
83. USAID-Sponsored TV Broadcasts Criticized, DuavN AvAz, Aug. 21, 1996, available
in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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evision stations to air the advertisements. 8 4 However, according to local
Bosnian newspapers, much of the population viewed the ads as
condescending.85
Despite the negligible impact of the respective efforts of OBN, FERN,
NATO, and other groups to provide the most ill-informed public with more
objective information, and despite the fact that the nationalistic, party-con-
trolled television stations in each entity continued to have the most influ-
ence over the respective ethnic populations, the OSCE went ahead with the
September 1996 national elections.8 6 Not surprisingly, the same national-
ist leaders who led their respective peoples through four years of war were
re-elected.
Although the national elections were over, the international commu-
nity in Bosnia-Herzegovina continued to emphasize the importance of
establishing an independent and pluralist media in the country, particu-
larly before the September 1997 municipal elections. In October 1996, one
month after the national elections, the donors reconvened in Brussels.
They agreed to continue supporting OBN until it became profitable, which
they estimated could take anywhere from three to five years.87
Even with the pledged support, the network was plagued with difficul-
ties. The various sponsors started bickering with each other over how the
network should be run. The Bosnian government began to feel threatened
and became difficult. The Bosnia-Herzegovina state communications
directorate sent a letter to the OHR accusing the international community
itself of violating international law by, in effect, granting a license to OBN
without coordinating with the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.88
The Bosnian government filed a complaint with the International Telecom-
munication Union, claiming interference with the existing frequencies.8 9
The Bosnian Serbs, who had refused to take part in OBN, accused it of
being pro-Muslim. 90 Even the stations participating in the network started
getting angry. They expected funds and autonomy and got neither. They
anticipated independence when producing programming for OBN, but a
separate central OBN staff in Sarajevo was hired, vested with the power to
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Elections at the municipal level, which were also supposed to be held that
month, were postponed because of suspected Serb voter registration fraud and a lack of
freedom of movement throughout the country. See Local Bosnian Election Postponed but
Serbs Say They Will Go Ahead, DEUTSCHE PRESsE-AGENTuR, Aug. 27, 1996, available in
LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
87. See Donors Discuss Development of TVIN Network, Oslobodjenje, Oct. 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
88. See Bosnia Complains TVIN "Violated International Law" (Radio Bosnia-
Hercegovina broadcast, Oct. 1, 1996), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB
File.
89. See id.
90. See Independent TV Network Under Fire in Bosnia, Reuters World Service, Jan. 5,
1998, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File; see also Serbs Protest Against
Terms Used to Describe Bosnia-Hercegovina, (Bosnian Serb Television broadcast, July 20,
1998), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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judge whether the programming offered by the participating stations met
professional standards. More often than not, OBN central claimed the pro-
gramming of the participating stations did not meet professional standards
and much of it was never aired.91 In consequence, OBN aired more inter-
nationally produced programs. All of the stations complained about their
lack of independent control, and one of them, Studio 99, pulled out of the
OBN.9 2
As the difficulties grew, it became clear that neither the Bosnians nor
the donors were happy with OBN and that few people were watching it.93
Finally, in April 1997, the OSI withdrew its money and support, dealing
the biggest blow yet to the network.94 There were rumors that the whole
project would collapse. However, the donor nations and the EU vowed to
continue financing the project,95 and in August 1997, OHR hired a new
team of Bosnians to run OSI. 96
F. Direct Aid - USAID, Soros, EC/EU, and Others
In addition to the OBN, the USIA, USAID, and other groups used other
means to create and develop a more pluralistic press. Europe and Newly
Independent States (ENI), a part of USAID, was disbursing contracts to
Internews and IREX to provide training and buy equipment for television
stations other than OBN.97 The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI),
another branch of USAID, established offices in Banja Luka, Sarajevo,
Tuzla, and Zenica and began providing direct grants to independent
media. 98 OTI disbursed $6.3 million dollars to media in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina between February 1996 and November 1998.99
By the spring of 1997, the situation had changed somewhat. Several
months before the municipal elections, the United States had decided to
back Biljana Plavsic, a one-time Karadzic associate who had turned against
the war-time leader and established a stronghold in Banja Luka. A ten-
dency on the part of a local media source to favor Plavsic was likely to yield
greater U.S. financial support. In the spring of 1997, OTI gave out $4 mil-
91. See TVIN Reportedly Not Meeting Initial Expectations, supra note 79.
92. See Sarajevo-Based Studio 99 Leaves TVIN Independent Stations Network, DNEVNI
AVAZ, Sept. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
93. See, e.g., Wartime Leaders Cling on to Media to Cling on to Power, ACENCE FRM.qCE
PliassE, Jan. 31, 1997, at 5.
94. Soros to Stop Financing TVIN Television, Oslobodjenje, Apr. 23, 1997, available in
LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
95. See TVIN Says It Will Continue Despite Soros Withdrawal, Onasa News Agency,
Apr. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
96. As of late 1998, OBN covered 50 to 55% of the population. Of those who watch
it, 76% say they watch it regularly and find it more credible than the available nationalist
stations. See generally Open Broadcast Network, Press Release (Sept. 8, 1998) <http://
www.ohr.int/obn/p980908c.htm>.
97. See generally U.S. Agency for International Development Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Media Program Fact Sheet (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.usaid.ba/
information/sheets/medianov98.htm> [hereinafter Media Program Fact Sheet]; see also
Internews Balkans (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.internews.ba/>.
98. See Media Program Fact Sheet, supra note 97.
99. See id.
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lion dollars in media grants to nineteen newspapers, twenty-seven radio
stations and eight television stations.100 Few, if any, independent sources
of news and information had been available in Republika Srpska in the
spring of 1996, but by the next year, television, radio and newspapers sup-
ported by OTI helped inform the public about the power struggle between
Plavsic and Karadzic. 1 1 The alternative media financed by OTI attempted
to uncover past instances of government corruption, economic distress and
lost opportunities. 10 2 This laid the groundwork for Plavsic to consolidate
power.103
In addition to these efforts by USAID, the EU and OSI, various govern-
ments gave direct grants, for training and equipment, to various independ-
ent media in both Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation. For
example, OSI set up a broadcast training school in conjunction with the
BBC where young journalists were brought to Sarajevo from all over Bosnia-
Herzegovina for six weeks to receive training from BBC journalists and
producers. 10 4
G. Seizure of Transmitters and Post-Seizure Details
In spite of these efforts to create alternative sources of information across
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the media remained divided into three mutually
antagonistic components based in Republika Srpska, Bosniak-controlled
Federation territory, and Croat-controlled Federation territory. The
respective party-controlled television stations remained the most influen-
tial media outlets and the main source of news for each of Bosnia's ethnic
groups. The international community's attempts to create an alternative to
the party-controlled media had not been sufficient to combat the national-
ist television stations, which continued to stir up hostility. Indeed, the sta-
tions were not only hostile towards each other, but also towards the
international community and Sfor. Sfor and the OHR felt that much of
their work toward reconciliation was being jeopardized by the news and
propaganda of nationalist television and radio.
On May 30, 1997, the members of the Steering Board (the Board) of
the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) of the Contact Group had their
semi-annual meeting in Sintra, Portugal, to review the progress of Dayton's
implementation. 105 Regarding the relationship between the media and the
Dayton Accords, the Board concluded that "[t]he promotion of [an]
100. See id.
101. See Future of Bosnian Serb Media Assessed, Beta News Agency, Feb. 12, 1998,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
102. See, e.g., Elizabeth Neuffer, Media War in Bosnia Gives Serbs a Choice on Truth,
WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1997, at Al.
103. See Future of Bosnian Serb Media Assessed, supra note 101.
104. For information on the BBC School of Journalism, see Soros Foundation, Open
Society Fund - Bosnia and Herzegovina (visited Apr. 17, 1999) <http://
www.soros.org.ba/Programs/programs-mediacenter.html>.
105. See Political Declaration from the Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the
Peace and Implementation Council (visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.ohr.int/docu/
d970530a.htm> [hereinafter Sintra Declaration].
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independent media is an essential step for developing democratic institu-
tions."' 0 6 This conclusion was formalized in the Sintra Declaration (the
"Declaration"), which OHR treated as an extension of the Accords, though
neither the elected Bosnian officials nor the original signatories to the
Accords were required to sign the Declaration.
The Declaration attempted to encourage independent media in a vari-
ety of ways. In addition to calling for more support for the development of
OBN, the Declaration called on the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina to
"give every possible form of practical assistance with respect to licenses,
frequencies, free access by the High Representative to news media, and the
ability of the OBN and other independent media to broadcast."10 7 This
dramatic assertion called for granting a right of access to the international
authorities thus according the right to acquire time on radio and television
and possibly receive free space in newspapers without the editorial discre-
tion of their editors. The Declaration then stated that the High Representa-
tive "has the right to curtail or suspend any media network or programme
whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit
or letter of the Peace Agreement."' 08 This extraordinary provision of the
Declaration established the right of Sfor and the OHR to block media out-
lets throughout Bosnia. It also provided the framework Sfor used to justify
its later seizure of television towers in Republika Srpska.
In the months following the Sintra Declaration, Plavsic openly chal-
lenged Karadzic for power and accused him and his associates of war-profi-
teering and corruption. The fledgling independent newspapers and radio
stations in Republika Srpska that had been receiving support from various
international organizations and governments reported her condemna-
tions.10 9 Her message struck enough of a chord with the Serb people that
she began building significant popular support. Desperate to find an alter-
native to Karadzic, the main impediment to successful implementation of
the Accords, the United States and the other Western powers threw their
backing behind Plavsic. 1"0 This support included a media-related strategy,
with assistance from the international community.
By July 1997, Plavsic's popularity had grown almost to the point that
Republika Srpska was split in two. She controlled the western half, cen-
tered around Banja Luka, and the politicians loyal to Karadzic in Pale gov-
erned the eastern half. Nonetheless, the Pale faction still had control of
106. Id. cl 66. The Board stressed the importance of an independent media in pro-
moting pluralism, free elections, and access to information. See id.
107. Id. 1 69.
108. Id. '1 70.
109. See President Plavsic Hails Agreement On Elections, Renews Sleaze Charges (Bos-
nian Serb Television broadcast, Sept. 27, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
BBCSWB File; Vesna Peric-Zimonjic, Bosnia-Herzegovina: TV a Weapon in Plavsic's War
on Hardliners, lNrE PRmss SERVICE, Aug. 26, 1997.
110. See Steven Erlanger, NATO at Crossroads in Bosnia: Serb Power Struggle Is Seen as
'Defining Moment', N.Y. TMEs, Aug. 31, 1997, Sunday Final Late Edition, Section 1, at 12
("It's not about supporting Plavsic per se, or her own unsavory henchmen. But Plavsic,
like her or not, is exercising legitimate authority.").
Cornell International Law Journal
SRT, which was portraying Plavsic as a "traitor to the Serb nation" and a
"pawn of the international community.""'' Unless Plavsic could more
effectively reach the people receiving broadcasts from SRT, her chances of
winning the electoral battle were slim.
On August 14, U.S. Senator Carl Levin, the ranldng Democrat on the
Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested that U.S. planes jam SRT sig-
nals while simultaneously transmitting "broadcasts that depict the true rea-
sons for [the Serbian people's] isolation and poor standing in the
international community."1 12 Bosnian Serb leaders were furious. The Bos-
nian Serb information minister, Miroslav Toholj, stated that "[a]ny U.S.
administration operation to jam SRT will be considered an act of war and
will be treated as such." 1 3 Several days later, on August 18, OHR
requested that SRT broadcast a statement intended to inform the Serb pub-
lic about the content of the Sintra Declaration and the obligation of leaders
on all sides in Bosnia to abide by it. 1 1 4 SRT refused. Instead, it ran a
report comparing Sfor with the Nazis and referred to them as "occupying
forces." With the logo "SS-for" instead of Sfor, the broadcast alternated
images of Sfor soldiers with World War II German Stormtroopers. 1 15
In a response on August 23, the new High Representative, Carlos Wes-
tendorp, sent a letter to Momcilo Krajisnik, the Serb member of the Bosnia-
Hercegovian Presidency, demanding that SRT broadcast an OHR statement
explaining the Sintra Declaration by 10 PM that day. 1 6 In the letter, Wes-
tendorp wrote, "[i]f this is not done, I am prepared to use my powers,
including those stemming from the Sintra Declaration." ' 1 7 This was essen-
tially a threat to impose a protectorate over SRT. Westendorp called the
broadcast comparing Sfor to Nazis "absolutely unacceptable."' " 8 He sug-
gested Sfor might take action by seizing television towers to stop the Pale
media propaganda against the peace forces in Bosnia. 119 SRT promptly
submitted to Westendorp's demand, and broadcast the statement before
the deadline. However, immediately afterwards, SRT announced that the
111. See, e.g., Tom Hundley, Media Play the Messengers for Karadzic, CHI. Tru., Sept.
23, 1997, North Sports Final Edition, at 8; Alexandra Niksic, Voters Go To Polls in
Divided Serb Republic in an Attempt to End Split, AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE, Nov. 22, 1997, at
12.
112. Carl Levin, Broadcast the Truth to Bosnia, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1997, at A17.
113. Bosnian Serb TV Head Warns Against U.S. Jamming, Dnevni Telegraf, Aug. 14,
1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
114. See Bosnian Serb Radio-TV Reported to be Unrepentant About Editorial Policy
(Radio B92 broadcast, Aug. 23, 1997), available in Lexis, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB
File.
115. See id.
116. See Office of the High Representative, Bulletin No. 58, (Aug. 26, 1997) <http://
www.ohr.int/bulletins/b970826.htm>. Krajisnik was the chairman of the managing
board of SRT in Pale. See id.
117. Id.
118. Threat To Use Force To Stop Bosnian Serb Broadcasts, Beta News Agency, Aug. 23,
1997, available in Lexis, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
119. See id.; see also Split In Bosnian Serb Media, MONITORiNG RESEARCH, Aug. 28, 1997,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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High Representative's actions exceeded the bounds of the Dayton Accords
and re-broadcast the clip comparing Sfor to the Nazis. 120
Claiming that SRT management in Karadzic-controlled Pale was "stir-
ring up political conflicts and engaging in an aggressive propaganda that
[was] breaking up state unity," 12 1 the SRT station in Banja Luka
announced that it was cutting its ties with the SRT management in Pale.
Until that time, the SRT station in Banja Luka only re-transmitted news
from Pale and had very little of its own programming. The employees at
the Bajna Luka SRT station, sympathetic to Plavsic, had been working for
days to create their own programs. On August 24, SRT Banja Luka began
airing its own programming. 12 2 Three days later, police loyal to Plavsic
seized the Duge Njive transmitter near Doboj, one of the largest cities in-the
western half of Bosnia and the tower began broadcasting SRT programming
from Banja Luka. 123 SRT's broadcast territory was now split in two, with
SRT Banja Luka broadcasting to the western half of Republika Srpska, and
SRT Pale to the eastern half.1 24
On August 22, U.S. troops seized a television broadcast tower in
Udrigovo, a northeastern town, under the pretense that they were trying to
prevent possible dashes between Plavsic's supporters and Karadzic's sup-
porters. Chris Riley, a Sfor spokesman, stated that the seizure was not
intended "to influence which programme will be broadcast via the trans-
mitter. All we want is to prevent conflicts, but we will use any force
deemed necessary at any attempt of violence."1 2 5 Seasoned observers
assumed Riley's statements were intended to mask Sfor's intent to hand the
tower over to SRT Banja Luka.12 6 On Sept. 1, the U.S. troops guarding the
tower were attacked by a mob of more than two hundred and fifty Serbs
who were presumed to be supporters of Karadzic. 1 27 Pale radio broadcast
that Sfor had "occupied" an SRT transmitter and claimed Sfor was a "heav-
ily-armed military force threatening courageous unarmed citizens." 128
120. See Bosnian Serb Radio-TV Reported to be Unrepentant About Editorial Policy,
supra note 114.
121. Split In Bosnian Serb Media, supra note 119.
122. See Banja Luka TV Splits From Pale, Beta News Agency, Aug. 24, 1997, available
in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. See also Split In Bosnian Serb Media, supra
note 119.
123. See Pale-Controlled Media Carry Anti-Sfor Statements (Bosnian Serb Television
broadcast, Aug. 28, 1997), available in LEXIS, AILWRD Library, BBCSWB File; Doboj
Resumes Transmitting Pale Programmes, Tanjung News Agency, Aug. 27, 1997, available
in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. Sfor seems to have been working in some
degree of cooperation with the police loyal to Plavsic. See Split in Bosnian Serb Media,
supra note 119.
124. See Split in Bosnian Serb Media, supra note 119.
125. SforJustifies Takeover of Transmitter, HINA News Agency, Sept. 1, 1997, available
in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
126. See id.
127. See NATOISFOR, Joint Press Conference (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://
www.nato.int/sfor/trans/1997/t970902a.htrn> [hereinafter NATO/SFOR Briefing].
128. Serb Broadcasts Resume in North After Sfor Handover (Bosnian Serb Radio broad-
cast, Sept. 1, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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After the seizure, SRT Pale's signal could not reach the northeastern part of
the Republika Srpska.
What followed was a negotiation between the Sfor and the Pale author-
ities, resulting in a document that became known as the Udrigovo Agree-
ment (the "Agreement"). 12 9 Pursuant to the Agreement, on September 2,
1997, Sfor handed the tower back to the SRT authorities in Pale.130
Included in the Agreement were the following conditions: that the Repub-
lika Srpska media stop producing inflammatory reports against Sfor and
the other international organizations implementing the Dayton Accords;131
that SRT Pale would regularly provide an hour of prime time programming
to air political views other than those of the ruling party;13 2 that SRT Pale
provide Westendorp with a daily half hour of prime time programming to
introduce himself and talk about recent developments; 133 and that the
Republika Srpska agree to abide by all the rules being established by the
international community's Media Support Advisory Grotip (MSAG), which
had not yet been formally declared but was in the process of being
constructed.13 4
In the wake of the Udrigovo Agreement and the formation of the
MSAG, the Serb leadership in Pale appeared to take a more conciliatory
tone towards the Western diplomats implementing the Accords. On Sep-
129. Memorandum of Agreement for Release of Udrigovo Tower (CQ334489) (Sept. 2,
1997) <http://www.ohr.int/press/p970902a.htm> [hereinafter Udrigovo Agreement].
See also NATO/SFOR Briefing, supra note 127. A summary of the Agreement is
presented at Office of the High Representative, Bulletin No. 59 (Sept. 5, 1997) <http://
www.ohr.int/bulletins/b970905.htm#5>. The Agreement was formally signed by Com-
mander of Multi National Division (North) Major-General David Grange, the SRT Editor-
in-Chief, Drago Vukovic and the Deputy Minister of Interior (and Chairman of the Board
for SRT), General Karisik. See id.
130. See Serb Broadcasts Resume in North After Sfor Handover (Bosnian Serb Radio
broadcast, Sept. 1, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
131. See Udrigovo Agreement, supra note 129 (SRT would refrain from inflammatory
reporting against SFOR and international organizations supporting the Dayton Peace
Agreement.).
132. See id.
133. See id. SRT would provide the High Representative one half-hour during prime
time to introduce himself and explain the events which took place in Brcko, Bijejina and
Banja Luka. Such time would be unedited and not commented on in advance or after
airing by SRT commentators. The agreement also said that time would only be
demanded for a short while. Presumably the short while would be just long enough for
Westendorp to become known by Serbs. See id.
134. See id. Republika Srpska agreed to participate in a full and consistent manner in
a Media Support Advisory Group (MSAG) conducted by the OHR to discuss and regulate
the work of the media in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment. The MSAG consists of the OHR, SFOR, the OSCE, and the United Nations, the
four principal organizations responsible for the implementation of the Accords. Estab-
lished in late September 1997, MSAG's function was essentially to monitor and govern
the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent that it could according to the Sintra decla-
ration and the OSCE's MEC. The MSAG declared itself "the body that provided the
executive mechanism to demand the level and type of access required in an outlet
deemed in violation of the... MEC. If such demands were not complied with the MSAG
would then recommend escalation as necessary" using the paragraph 70 powers of the
Sintra Declaration giving the High Representative authority to "curtail or suspend" any
media network or program whose output was in violation of the Dayton Accords. See id.
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tember 4, the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Information agreed to allow OBN to
broadcast from one of its transmitters on Mount Trebevic.' 35 But that
cooperation was short-lived. On September 8, the OHR and Sfor sent a
letter to SRT Pale demanding ninety minutes of airtime to broadcast an
OHR program that same evening, an hour of airtime the following day, and
ten minutes of airtime for the High Representative on Thursday, September
11 and Saturday, September 13, all unedited.' 36 SRT Pale contended that
these demands were far in excess of the requirements of the Udrigovo
agreement.137
SRT Pale refused to broadcast the material, and instead accused OHR
and Sfor of violating "freedom and human rights."138 The SRT Pale new-
scaster read a statement from the SRT Pale editorial board stating:
We publicly announce that under no conditions would we implement these
requests. By doing this, we would trample on our moral integrity and our
profession. In our radio and TV broadcast, we shall continue to ridicule
orders like the one saying that video material must be broadcast in its
entirety and with no changes .... 139
The announcer then invited the High Representative to appear live "as a
guest on the programme and talk to journalists and the audience instead of
cowardly squeezing into programmes and sending ultimatums to broadcast
pre-recorded tapes." 140
Against this background of increased conflict on the airwaves of
Republika Srpska, and the raised stakes for political control of the SRT as
the election drew nearer, the appeal for international jamming of SRT Pale
gained currency. The United States dispatched three Air Force EC-130
Commando Solo planes capable both of broadcasting information and jam-
ming existing radio and television signals.' 4 ' These aircraft had been used
for similar purposes in Haiti, Panama, and Grenada. U.S. officials claimed
that the primary role of the electronic warfare planes would be to broadcast
"fair and balanced news and information" to the local population, 42 but
Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to Bosnia-Herzegovina also stated that
the planes had the capability to jam pro-Karadzic transmissions.' 43 VOA
reported the American belief that Karadzic supporters had violated the
135. See Serbs Allow International TV To Use Transmitter (Bosnian Serb Television
broadcast, Sept. 4, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
136. See Serbs Sever Links With International Envoys (Radio B92 broadcast, Sept. 8,
1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
137. See id. SRT argued that giving in to OHR's and Sfors demands would "trample
on [their] moral integrity and profession." Id.
138. Serbs Sever Links With International Envoys, supra note 136.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Arrival of U.S. "Jamming" Aircraft Raises Controversy (Voice of America broad-
cast, Sept. 13, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. The Air Force
EC-130 is an electronics warfare plane operated by the Pennsylvania Air National Guard.
See id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
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Udrigovo Agreement that mandated the supporters soften their rhetoric
against Plavsic and NATO peacekeeping troops.144
The VOA broadcasts during this critical time also included an inter-
view with Pentagon spokesman Dave Arlington who stated: "Commander
Sfor controls the airwaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, OK, so he is well within
his mandate to be able to broadcast; and he will be the guy that's managing
the frequencies and the broadcasts there within the theater."'145 This con-
tention made clear what had been only obliquely suggested before, namely
that Sfor had ultimate control of the airwaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This
disturbed not only the Karadzic faction, but the other Bosnian factions as
well, all of whom became more vocal against what they called "media colo-
nization."'1 46 Western press freedom organizations also protested possible
jamming. 147 The planes were not put into immediate service, but were
held in readiness at bases in Italy. 148
As the local elections loomed nearer, and the battle for the Republika
Srpska's airwaves correspondingly grew more bitter, Western diplomats
feared the media conflict could lead to more violence. Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic was urged to summon Plavsic and Krajisnik to Bel-
grade. That meeting, held on September 24, produced the Belgrade Agree-
ment, an internationally brokered "fairness doctrine" for SRT Banja Luka
and SRT Pale. The Belgrade Agreement stated:
President Biljana Plavsic 149 and President Momcilo Krajisnik 150 agree that
the unified media environment of the Republika Srpska and free access to
media by all participants in elections is vital for their being held in a demo-
cratic manner. They agreed that news programmes be broadcast daily from
studios in Pale and Banja Luka alternately. 15'
Hope for a harmonious implementation of the Belgrade Agreement
was immediately dashed. Only a day after it was signed, the MSAG
"expressed concern about the editorial policies" of SRT Pale. 152 A news
release from the OHR stated that SRT Pale continued to broadcast political
announcements as news "devoid of any balance or alternative opinion."'153
Characteristically, SRT Pale refused to soften its editorial content.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Bosnian Radio Head: Proposed Media Bill "Entirely Unacceptable," DNEVNI AvAz,
July 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
147. See Editorial Desk, Bosnia's Polluted Airwaves, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at A22.
148. See U.S. Jamming Aircraft Not Yet Used In Bosnia (Voice of America Broadcast,
Sept. 20, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
149. PIavsic was the President of Republika Srpska.
150. Krajisnk was the Serb representative to Bosnia's federal tripartite presidency.
151. Agreement on Resolution of R.S. Crisis, Sept. 24, 1997, Cl 3, [hereinafter Belgrade
Agreement] (on file with author). See also Bosnian Serbs Resume Unified TV, Radio
Broadcasts (Radio B92 broadcast, Sept. 27, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
BBCSWB File.
152. See Belgrade Agreement, supra note 151, point 3.
153. Id. See Office of the High Representative, Press Release (Sept. 25, 1997) <http://
www.ohr.int/press/p970925a.htm>.
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The following day, on September 26, the chief prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal), Lou-
ise Arbour, gave a press conference in Sarajevo, which was covered by
SRT.154 The Bosnian Serb leadership had always maintained that the Tri-
bunal was not a legitimate juridical body, but rather a political body
designed to denigrate the reputation of the Serbs. Consistent with this
view, an SRT Pale announcer introduced Arbour's press conference with a
commentary claiming that the Tribunal was a political instrument and that
it was prejudiced against the Serbs.155 The United Nations, which is a
member of the MSAG, considered this a breach of prior understandings,
including the Udrigovo Agreement, and demanded that SRT Pale make a
public apology on television.' 5 6 On September 30, SRT Pale did so, stat-
ing, "Serb-Radio-TV in this way wishes to apologize unreservedly for its
misrepresentation of a news conference given by the prosecutor of The
Hague Tribunal, Louise Arbour. We will read out a statement to this effect
made by the prosecutor. The statement will be followed by the complete
and unedited footage of the news conference given by Judge Arbour last
Friday, during her visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina." 15 7
In spite of SRT Pale's apology, Sfor troops seized control of certain SRT
transmitters on October 1 and prevented SRT Pale from transmitting its
broadcasts.' 5 8 In addition to claiming that SRT Pale's commentary was a
violation of the Sintra Declaration, Western governments also claimed that
SRT Pale's repeated broadcast comparing Sfor troops to Nazis constituted a
threat to the safety of the Sfor soldiers and therefore needed to be
silenced.15 9
Whether out of conviction or from political need to state solidarity
with those in Pale, Plavsic sent a letter to the High Representative, request-
ing him to allow SRT Pale to resume broadcasting. "Your Excellency," she
wrote,
[o]n the occasion of your decision that Sfor take over and assume control of
most relays in the Serb Republic, I urge you to enable the broadcasting of
television programmes from the Banja Luka and Pale studios .... Your
action is justified and there was indeed a violation of the [Udrigovo] agree-
ment. ... However, it is not in the interest of the Serb Republic that Pale televi-
sion be excluded from the unified television network of the Serb Republic. I
urge you to consider this.160
154. See Serb Radio-TV Apologizes "For Misrepresentation," Beta News Agency, Sept.
30, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See NATO-Led Forces Take Over Bosnian Serb Transmitters Bosnia Serb News
Agency, Oct. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File; see also Office
of the High Representative, Press Release (Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.ohr.int/press/
p971001a.htm>.
159. See id.
160. Plavsic Urges Westendorp Not to Close Down Pale TV (Bosnian Serb Television
broadcast, Oct. 1, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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Sensitive to the potential for condemnation of the seizure, Sfor and
OHR announced that SRT Pale could regain access to the transmission net-
work and resume operations, but only if strict conditions were met. SRT
Pale would be obliged to agree to "criteria for its reconstruction and reor-
ganization, as well as for editorial control of broadcasting, as suggested by
the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the inter-
national community."1 61 To protest the silencing of their station, employ-
ees at SRT Pale went on strike. They then held a meeting with twenty local
radio stations in Republika Srpska and sent an appeal to the international
community to "lift the blockade of the SRT transmitters."'1 62
In Banja Luka meanwhile, the Association of Journalists of Republika
Srpska (UNRS) stated that they agreed with the demands of the striking
journalists at SRT Pale and appealed for Sfor to return the four transmitters
it had seized. 163 However, the association, which was loyal to Plavsic, also
stated that it "'would be wise' if the SRT board of management, headed by
Krajisnik, were to resign" and if the Republika Srpska government
"appointed an interim managerial board consisting of party representatives
and non-party people until the new republican parliament [was]
constituted." 164
Several days after NATO seized the transmitters, Robert Gelbard, the
U.S. special envoy for the Balkans, appeared in the region. He met with
both Krajisnik and Westendorp. The same day, Simon Haselock, Wes-
tendorp's spokesman, announced that the OHR was "developing a strategy
for solving the issue of political influence on the media in Bosnia-
Herzegovina." 165
The following day, Westendorp dictated the criteria SRT Pale needed
to meet in order to go back on the air. He demanded that all politicians
(including Krajisnik and information minister Toholj) withdraw from
SRT's board of directors and give up their right to control the station. 166 In
a letter to Krajisnik two days later, the High Representative went on to say
that (1) a "transitory international director-general" and two deputies
would be appointed by the OHR to head SRT Pale; (2) that the OHR would
draft a statute and editorial charter for the station; (3) that SRT Pale would
be obliged to broadcast programs requested by officials from the interna-
tional community without editing or commentary; and (4) that a team of
journalists and editors would be brought in to train personnel and super-
161. SRT Pale Studio Staff Strike Over Seized Transmitter (Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina
broadcast, Oct. 3, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
162. Radio-TV Staff in Pale Go on Strike, Tanjug News Agency, Oct. 4, 1997, available
in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
163. See Media Directors Appeal for Freedom of Expression and Information, Bosnian
Serb News Agency, Oct. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
164. Id.
165. High Representative Seeks to Cut Political Influence on Media, HINA News Agency,
Oct. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
166. See Changes in SRT Sought by High Representative (Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina
broadcast, Oct. 7, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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vise the programming of SRT Pale.167 He added that SRT journalists and
editors would be evaluated by the international representatives and that
"only those who are positively evaluated will be able to get a job again."'168
This was an extraordinary assertion of power by the High Representative
and it infuriated the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale.
On October 10, the editor of SRT Pale announced, "the international
community is planning to introduce a protectorate over Serb Radio-Televi-
sion and to destroy it."'16 9 Both Krajisnik and the Bosnian Serb Prime Min-
ister at the time, Gojko Klickovic, rejected Westendorp's demands and
challenged the OHR's legal basis for seizing the TV transmitters and re-
organizing the board of directors of SRT Pale. 170 In a twist of historical
fate,17 1 the Russians announced that the international community's block-
ade on SRT Pale was an untenable violation of the Belgrade Agreement.'172
Meanwhile, the staff of SRT, deprived of their normal distribution
methods and allegedly on strike, kept trying to devise ways to get around
the NATO blockade. 173 Much to the chagrin of Sfor, the Serbs figured out
how to broadcast by circumventing the TV transmitters Sfor had seized. 17 4
On October 16, twelve days after the NATO blockade began, SRT Pale
began broadcasting again, using the same frequencies of SRT Banja
Luka. 175 Suddenly, viewers could watch SRT Pale in the eastern parts of
the Republika Srpska.17 6 SRT Pale newscasters also announced the end of
their strike but made no mention of the Sfor seizure. 17 7 A news bulletin
stated that its viewers were satisfied at "again having the opportunity to
watch programmes broadcast by Serb Sarajevo Studio."'178
SRT Pale had disconnected SRT Banja Luka's signal from a critical TV
transmitter (Veliki Zep) near Han Pijesak (the site of Ratko Mladic's mili-
167. See High Representative to Appoint New Serb Radio-TV Head, Beta News Agency,
Oct. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
168. SRT Editor Rejects Attempts to Set Up "Protectorate," Beta News Agency, Oct. 9,
1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
169. Id.
170. See Bosnian Serbs Reject Demands on SRT, Beta News Agency, Oct. 10, 1997,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
171. See Mike O'Connor, Defying NATO, Hard-Line Serbs Resume Broadcasting in Bos-
nia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at A12 (stating that officials from Eastern Europe felt that
shutting down the Serb broadcast system "smacked of the authoritarian tactics used
under Communism").
172. See Russia Reportedly Opposed to Measures Against SRT, Bosnian Serb News
Agency, Oct. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
173. See, e.g., Alternative Pale TV Broadcasts Soon (Bosnian Serb Radio broadcast, Oct.
13, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File (describing how the edi-
tor in chief of SRT was attempting to set up a new studio and use the local media to
circumvent the NATO transmitter blockade).
174. See O'Connor, supra n~te 171.
175. See SRT Pale Studio Reappearance "A Mystery," Beta News Agency, Oct. 24, 1997,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
176. See id.
177. See SRT Workers End Their Strike, Bosnian Serb News Agency, Oct. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
178. "Radio-T.V. Serb Sarjevo Studio" Resumes Broadcasting, SRNA, Oct. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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tary headquarters). 179 It was the only transmitter not under Sfor's con-
trol.180 SRT Pale then used special military vehicles fitted with
broadcasting and jamming equipment to transmit its programs in contra-
vention of the NATO blockade. 18 1
It took Sfor two days to figure out what had happened.18 2 Intelligence
reports initially indicated that the Veliki Zep transmitter was the source of
the broadcasts. 183 However, when Sfor troops inspected the site, they
found it stripped of equipment and incapable of transmitting anything. 18 4
On October 19, Sfor called the destruction of the Veliki Zep transmitter an
act of sabotage designed to block the transmission of SRT Banja Luka into
eastern Serbia. 185
NATO responded immediately by deploying one of its Commando
Solo electronic warfare planes to jam the mobile SRT Pale broadcasts. 18 6
The plane also transmitted a message to Serbs in eastern Bosnia that the
Pale authorities were responsible for the interruption of regular SRT Banja
Luka programming. 18 7 On the same day, a mysterious explosion destroyed
a transmitter in Bijeljina that was key to SRT Pale's ability to circumvent the
NATO blockade. 188 SRT Pale's broadcasting ability effectively was
destroyed. 189 Several days later, Western diplomats in Sarajevo suggested
broadcasting SRT Banja Luka to eastern Bosnia via U.S. satellite. 190 By
October 31, this was done and Serbs in eastern Bosnia could watch only
179. See Bosnian Serb Radio Behaviour (World Broadcast Information, Oct. 24, 1997),
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
180. See id. OHR spokesman Simon Haselock responded to the Serb attempt to cir-
cumvent the NATO blockade by stating:
They were given the opportunity to restructure and to discuss the practicalities
of how that might take place. They refused to engage in that process. What
they've done was first of all try and [sic] circumvent it. There's nothing particu-
larly brilliant about that. The second thing they've done is that when it's clear to
them that they aren't going to be able to circumvent it, they sabotaged the sys-
tem. This is the act of children.
Id.
181. See "Special Vehicles" Reportedly Used to Broadcast Pale SRT, DNEVNI AvAZ, Oct.
21, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
182. See Mike O'Connor, NATO Says It Shut Serb Radio to Silence Propaganda, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1997, at A3.
183. See Serb Transmitter in Eastern Bosnia to be out of Commission for Some Time
(SRNA Telephone Service, Oct. 21, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
BBCSWB File.
184. See id.
185. See Message Instead of TV Programmes Seen in Pale Area (Serb Radio broadcast,
Oct. 19, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
186. See U.S. Aircraft Said to be Jamming Pale SRT Programmes (Serb Radio broadcast,
OcL 20, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
187. See id.
188. See Blast Damages Serb Transmitter, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at A15.
189. See id. There were all kinds of accusations about who was responsible for the
blast, but nothing ever proved conclusive. See, e.g., Democratic Party Behind Bomb at TV
Transmitter, Beta News Agency, Nov. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
BBCSWB File (accusing the leader of Republika Srpska's Democratic Party of destroying
the Bijeljina transmitter).
190. See Sfor Reportedly Ready to Beam Banja Luka TV Via Satellite, VEsii, Sept. 23,
1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
Vol. 33
2000 Information Intervention
SRT Banja Luka. 19 1
Ever resourceful, Karadzic's faction in Pale discovered yet another way
to continue broadcasting. On November 4, they set up an "electronic
media" center in eastern Bosnia, this time in Foca.192 This "technical and
information center" had the capability of broadcasting SRT Pale programs
to a significant portion of eastern Bosnia. 193 This time, because the action
did not interfere with the transmission of Banja Luka television, NATO and
the OHR did not take action. 194
Meanwhile, the OHR started expressing dissatisfaction with Croat TV
(HTV) in Mostar. Simon Haselock, the OHR spokesman, accused the stu-
dio in Mostar of "persistently resisting demands to tone down its reports"
and of using "provocative language." 195 He took particular offense to a
program aired by HTV Mostar that described Croats who wanted to co-
exist with Muslims as "lunatics" and threatened that "NATO would take
measures against HTV Mostar similar to those taken against Serb Radio-
TV."19 6
The Croats reacted angrily. The editor-in-chief of HTV Mostar, Milan
Sutalo, said that the station had never received any demands from the OHR
to tone down its rhetoric and he called "the statement that HTV Mostar
described those Croats who wanted to co-exist with Muslims as lunatics an
unprecedented lie." 197 He challenged the OHR to produce a public record-
,ing of the statement, or present evidence of any other "provocative" state-
ments issued by HTV Mostar.198 He even went so far as to accuse the OHR
of systematically attempting to destroy any independent Croat media. 199
He demanded an apology from the OHR and threatened to "approach inter-
national organizations for the protection of the freedom of the media and
human rights, and possibly initiate court proceedings." 200
191. See Serb TV Beamed to Pale Via Satellite From Banja Luka, Beta News Agency, Oct.
31, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
192. See Serbs Open Electronic Media Centre in East, Bosnian Serb News Agency, Nov.
4, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
193. See id.
194. See Serb Local TV Stations Link Up, VECERNJE NoviNE, Nov. 28, 1997, available in
LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
195. NATO Threatens to Take Steps Against Croat TV Mostar (Croat Radio Herceg-
Bosna broadcast, Oct. 11, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
196. Id.
197. Croat TV Mostar Chief Refutes Accusation (Croat Radio Herceg-Bosna, Oct. 17,
1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
198. See id.
199. See id. Mr. Sutalo stated:
We are concerned that the unfounded accusations on the one hand and forced
attempts to place Croat TV Mostar on the same level with Serb Radio-TV in Pale
on the other aim to provide an alibi for something which has been decided in
advance. The aim is to prevent Croat TV Mostar from broadcasting its pro-
gramme, just as it was done with Serb Radio-TV, which is to say to eliminate the
media of the Croat people, a sovereign and constituent people in Bosnia-
Hlercegovina, and weaken its position in this way.
Id.
200. Id.
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On October 27, the international community put HTV Mostar to the
test. After the station aired what was found to be a biased report on a car
bombing in Mostar, the OSCE, which was monitoring the broadcast,
ordered HTV Mostar to read a statement of apology in the first 15 minutes
of primetime newscasts for five consecutive evenings.2 0 1 Milan Sutalo
refused to read the statement and declared that the international commu-
nity's desire to eliminate HTV Mostar was "part of a broader strategy
aimed at marginalizing and exerting pressure against Bosnian Croats. '20 2
On November 9, Sutalo resigned, citing his unwillingness to read the OSCE
statement.20 3 He said reading it would have besmirched his dignity.20 4
When he left the station, many of his loyal staff members followed him,
causing HTV Mostar to go off the air.20 5
Bosnian government officials and local journalists were thrilled that
the international community finally shut down what they deemed Croat
hate television.20 6 However, they complained that the OHR, Sfor, and the
OSCE were not doing enough about Mostar TV and the new Bosnian Serb
network.20 7 Haselock responded to these complaints by stating, "[w]hat
we can do in this particular case is to monitor their programmes in order to
establish whether they have been violating the rules and regulations of the
Media Expert Commission. We cannot simply go and say 'we shall close
you down' if you say something against Biljana Plavsic. ' 20 8 In addition he
added,
[Elverything will be different from the New Year onwards, when a new media
commission starts operating within the OHR (The Commission for Media
Regulation and Licensing). All the media will have to possess an operating
license, which they will obtain on the basis of their compliance with world-
wide recognized media standards. A medium that fails to comply with those
standards will lose its license, and consequently its right to operate. How-
ever, if they continue to operate, sanctions of a different kind will follow. 20 9
201. See Mostar Chief Explains Rejection of OSCE Demand, HINA News Agency, Oct.
28, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. The apology statement
required HTV Mostar to admit that its report had "intentionally deceived the audience,
instigated violence and hatred against the Muslim (Bosniak) people, tried to divide the
peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina and used insulting language that stimulated the obstruc-
tion of the international community's work in implementing the Dayton Accords." Id.
202. Id.
203. See Mostar HTV Chief Editor Resigns Over OSCE Statement, HINA News Agency,
Nov. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
204. See id.
205. See NATOISFOR Joint Press Conference, M2 Presswire, Nov. 19, 1997, available in
LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
206. See, e.g., OSCE Welcomes Resignation of Mostar TV Chief, HINA News Agency,
Nov. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File (stating that the Bos-
nian mission to the OSCE welcomed the resignation of Milan Sutalo).
207. See Serb Local TV Stations Link Up, supra note 194.
208. Id.
209. Id. When the New Year actually arrived, Sonja Karadzic and other SDS officials
got together and launched another private television station called S-Kanal. See New
Serb TV's Alleged Link to Karadzic, VEREmJE NOVINE, Jan. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS,
ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File. It began broadcasting on January 14, but could only
be picked up in a small region surrounding Sarajevo. See Serb S-Kanal Launched from
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The Commission for Media Regulation and Licensing (CMRL) was
part of a comprehensive media reform package the OHR was planning to
implement in Bosnia.2 10 The OHR planned to establish two commis-
sions.2 11 The first commission's mission would be to "ensure that media
standards are respected and would issue licenses. 2 12 This was the
CMRL. 213 The second commission would be appellate in nature and deal
with complaints on media treatment or media behavior in the communica-
tions process."2 14 Haselock based this reform package on the allies' post-
war experience reforming the German media system. 215
II. The Legal Basis for Information Intervention
A. Introduction
Bosnia is an institutionally and legally complex case study of the phenome-
non newly christened as "information intervention."2 16 In the world of
ethnic and regional conflict, whether it involves Zapatistas in Mexico,
Kurds in Turkey, separatists in Ethiopia, or Tamils in Sri Lanka, terrestrial
transmitters and signals from satellites can become elements in campaigns
of violence by or against the state, and between communities with different
views of the public order. Specific actors in the international community,
however, see the use of media as a potential tool to reduce conflict or to
increase the possibility of democracy. 21 7
Bosnia experienced the use of almost all the instruments of informa-
tion intervention. 21 8 The international community provided assistance to
rebuild the infrastructure of the existing media, established an alternate
media network, set requirements for the electoral regulation, forced "cor-
rective" and official broadcasts, and created a legal framework for media
performance. It also jammed broadcasts, seized transmitters, and trans-
Pale, MONITORING RESEARCH, Jan. 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
BBCSWB File. Two days after its launch, the OHR warned that "if S-Kanal makes one
wrong move, we shall take appropriate action." OHR Warns of Action If S-Kanal "Makes
One Wrong Move," VECERNJE NOVINE, Jan. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
BBCSWB File. There were also allegations that the equipment used to launch S-Kanal
was the very equipment stolen earlier in the year from the Veliki Zep transmitter. This
allegation was potentially embarrassing to the international community because it was
the loss of this equipment that forced the OHR to spend a half million dollars to broad-
cast SRT Banja Luka to eastern Serbia via satellite. See id.
210. See High Representative's Plans to Reorganize Media, DNEcNI AVAZ, Oct. 30, 1997,
available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File (describing the methods the OHR
would use to "fundamentally" reconstruct the media in Bosnia).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See, e.g., Metzl, supra note 1, at 15 (coining the term "information intervention"
to describe monitoring, countering, and blocking radio and television transmissions that
incite widespread violence).
217. See supra Part I.
218. See id.
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formed the staff and leadership of broadcasting entities. 219 Internationally
designed and staffed media regulation bureaucracies, some tied to elec-
tions and some not, were all introduced in Bosnia.220 Finally, the OHR
attempted to rationalize the process by creating a comprehensive new regu-
latory scheme for a post-NATO, pluralistic, and unified multi-ethnic
state.221 If the international community is likely to use this type of inter-
vention as part of its peacekeeping arsenal, greater attention must be paid
to its legal framework, the circumstances in which it is justified, the extent
to which it is multilateral as opposed to unilateral, the structure of stan-
dards and remedies, the relationship of the military to civilian authoriza-
tions, and the role existing international norms should play.
B. The Law of Information Intervention
A fundamental question involves authority. What was the basis for the
international community to intervene in Bosnia and reshape Bosnia's
media and information space?222 This is no minor problem and already
there are debates about the sources of such authority. 223 If intervenors do
not act pursuant to legal authority themselves, their moral claim that con-
flict participants must follow the rule of law loses its credibility. Various
groups within Bosnia questioned whether the international community
had the legal power to reshape the information space in Bosnia. Outside
groups, including the World Press Freedom Committee, expressed grave
reservations as to whether the international community's actions in Bosnia
were consistent themselves with international norms.
The legal justification for media intervention in Bosnia is nowhere
clearly stated; nor is it necessarily true that the United States and other
parties sought or articulated such a legal justification at each step in the
process as they constantly had to respond to practical realities. But the
source of law matters. For example, if the United States and its Western
allies acted as "occupiers," then a particular body of international norms
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR (1991) (declaring the situation in the former Yugo-
slavia to constitute "a threat to international peace and security" under Article 39 of the
United Nations Charter); S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR (1992) (noting that the Government
of Yugoslavia requested a peace keeping operation be sent into the region and creating
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to enter Yugoslavia to restore condi-
tions of peace and security necessary to negotiate a settlement to the crisis); S.C. Res.
770, U.N. SCOR (1992) (authorizing the use of "all measures necessary" to ensure the
delivery of humanitarian aid to areas of Bosnia); S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR (1993)
(authorizing Member States to take all measures necessary to ensure compliance with a
previously established Security Council no-fly zone); S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR (1995)
(reaffirming the OSCE's and Sfor's mandate to implement the General Framework
Agreement); Dayton Accords, supra note 36, art. IX (stating that all parties agree to coop-
erate fully with all entities involved in implementing the peace agreement).
223. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIoNAL LAw 1381 (2d ed.
1995) (claiming that the legal justifications for intervening in the former Yugoslavia
have included at various times consent, transborder aggression, humanitarian needs,
human rights abuses, and the impact of the situation on other states).
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would govern their powers and the limits on them.224 If they acted, on the
other hand, under a consent regime, then the shape of their authority
would be governed, in large part, by the conditions of their particular entry
into Bosnia.225
Under current norms, which are subject to debate, the terms "occupa-
tion" and "belligerent occupation" do not describe the status of the interna-
tional presence in Bosnia.226 This is important because occupiers have the
capacity to act in lieu of a sovereign, although those actions are constrained
by the duty to serve as a surrogate for the local sovereign and to do so in
accord with internationally established standards.227 Indeed, in the Bos-
224. See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (1993)
(tracing the evolution of the law of occupation and outlining its role in modern warfare).
225. See, e.g., I. RIKYE Er AL., THE THIN BLUE LINE 24-30 (1974) (describing how the
role of U.N. peacekeepers is limited by the consent of the state that allowed their entry
onto its territory).
226. See, e.g., Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV), Oct. 18, 1907, art. 42, 36 Stat. at 2306
(declaring that "[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army") (emphasis added) [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. There
has been a debate about the use of the term "occupation" to describe the activities of the
international community in Bosnia and a debate, as well, over the use of the power of the
occupier to justify media and information intervention. See, e.g., id. art. 43 (stating that
the occupant shall take all measures to restore public order "while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country") (emphasis added); BENvENISTI,
supra note 223, at 12-20 (noting that "unless absolutely prevented" is subject to consid-
erable debate when applied to the scope of power an occupier may exercise when it
imposes a new legal, social, and political regime on an occupied country).
After World War II, the United States and its allies "belligerently occupied" Germany
andJapan. Compare SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST 177 (1996) (arguing that
the Allies did abide by norms consistent with the rights of a belligerent occupier with
respect to the occupations of Germany and Japan), with BENvENISTI, supra note 224, at
91-93 (pointing out that in Germany, at least, the Allies were not occupiers in the sense
conceived of by the Hague Regulations, but instead saw themselves as having assumed
complete sovereignty over Germany). The Allies aimed, inter alia, to refashion the radio
broadcasting systems in Germany andJapan. See Donna E. Arzt, Nuremberg, Denazifica-
tion and Democracy: The Hate Speech Problem at the International Military Tribunal, 12
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 689, 727-31 (1995) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY
OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1993)). This objective was part of the
larger mission of the Occupation in constructing a democratic society in the former Axis
nations. See BENvENISTI, supra note 224, at 91. To do that, the United States and its
allies imposed a legal regime that provided a mechanism to transform existing media
outlets in both countries. See Military Government Regulations, tit. 21, pt. 5 (1949),
reprinted in THE DEPARTMENT OP STATE, GERMANY 1947-1949: THE STORY IN DOcUMENTS
605 (1950) [hereinafter GERMANY 1947-1949].
In Germany, the Allies forever changed the structure of broadcasting. See Arzt, supra,
at 731. They split up and decentralized the dominant media outlets in order to prevent a
dominant national voice from arising. See Military Government Regulations, supra, at
605. In Japan, the U.S. government sought to eradicate all elements of militarism and
nationalism from the national voice. See WILLIAM J. SEBALD & C. NELSON SPINKS, JAPAN:
PROSPECTS, OPTIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 17 (1967). The first Memorandum of the Allies,
in somewhat Orwellian words, claimed to reestablish freedom of speech and press. See
Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, ch. II, sub. A. pt. 10 (1945), reprinted in GERMANY 1947-
1949, supra, at 49. At the same time it required that news be true to facts, faithful to the
policies of the Allied Powers, and refrain from skeptical criticisms of the Allied Forces.
See id.
227. See Hague Regulations, supra note 226, art. 43. The article in its entirety states:
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nian context, the limits of intervention start, as everything must, with the
General Framework Agreement for Peace, the Dayton Accords themselves.
The significance of the Dayton Accords is that the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via essentially consented to let the international community enter Bos-
nia.228 In other words, the powers of NATO, the OSCE, and the OHR, to
the extent they arise from the Dayton Accords, come from the Parties to the
Accord, not from the use of force or from other international doctrines.
Annex 6 of the Dayton Accords provides that the Parties "shall secure to all
persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recog-
nized human rights and fundamental freedoms," including freedom of
expression.229 Restructuring the media, including displacing some media
outlets and building new ones, might be termed, in a radical sense, the
securing of freedom of expression.230
Many of the actions described in the narrative were taken at the order
of the OHR. 23 1 Annex 10 of the Accords recognizes that fulfillment of each
Party's obligation under the terms of the treaty requires "a wide range of
activities" including "the establishment of political and constitutional insti-
tutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina," and the creation of a High Representa-
tive whose duties are "to facilitate the Parties' owri efforts
and ... coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved
in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement."232 This general architec-
tural commitment could be read to include the kinds of powers that Sfor
and NATO exercised in reshaping the media of Bosnia.
In Annex 1-A, the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Set-
tlements, each Party recognized that NATO would establish a multinational
military implementation force (first known as IFOR and then as Sfor)
"composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO
nations, deployed in Bosnia . . . to help ensure compliance" with the
Accords. 233 The Annex authorized IFOR to "take such actions as required,
including the use of necessary force ... to ensure its own protection. '2 34
In Annex 3 the Parties agreed to ensure "free and fair elections in ... a
politically neutral environment" and, to that end, they pledged to uphold
"freedom of expression and of the press."235 Additionally, the Parties
invited the OSCE to "supervise, in a manner to be determined by the OSCE
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and [civic life], while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
Id.
228. See Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex 1-A, art. I., art. III, art. VI.
229. Id. Annex 6, art. I.
230. The Allies used this same justification during the de-nazification programs in
Germany.
231. See supra Part I.
232. Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex 10, art. 1, 112.
233. Id. Annex 1-A, art. 1, '11, sub. a.
234. Id. Annex 1-A, art. 1, 2, sub. b.
235. Id. Annex 3, art. 1, 1.
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and in cooperation with other international organizations the OSCE deems
necessary, the preparation and conduct" for specific elections, including
the elections involved in the post-Dayton media disputes. 236
The Accords are a charter of authority, a specific and bounded invita-
tion to particular actors in the international community to participate in
the peace process in explicitly limited ways. They grant the international
community three important fonts of power. The first font of power is elec-
tion-specific and flows frorh Annex 3 of the Dayton Accords. 23 7 Many of
the aspirations embodied in the Dayton Accords and much of the interna-
tional community's involvement in Bosnia concerned the political process
and the media's indispensable involvement therein.238 The authority of
the international community in this area lay with the OSCE.23 9 On the
other hand, the OHR, with its powers to "coordinate"240 and to "facili-
tate"241 had power, derivatively, to deal with media questions relating to
elections.
For example, the PIC supported a comprehensive OHR media strategy
because of "the importance of the role of objective media in the run-up to
the 1998 elections .... ,"242 If a plural, multi-party Bosnia-Herzegovina was
to emerge from Dayton, then, at least in the eyes of the OHR, a morphologi-
cal unity between political party, ethnic group, and dominant channel had
to be broken. The OHR saw the Bosnian media structure as antithetical to
a multi-ethnic future polity. The seizure of the transmitters that serviced
SRT Pale was therefore part of a strategic plan to break the hold of the SDS
on the media and the electorate.243
In establishing the machinery for elections, the Parties agreed to put in
place a set of election principles and a mechanism for deciding when those
principles were violated.244 For example, the PEC established rules and
regulations rangirg from professional and ethical standards for the media
and journalists, 245 standards for fair reporting,246 and standards concern-
ing inflammatory language. 247 The international community also estab-
lished a Media Experts Commission.248 This entity had the basic
236. Id. Annex 3, art. 2, 1 2.
237. See id. Annex Ill. See also MARY FULBROOK, TI-E DIVIDED NATION: A HISTORY OF
GERMANY, 1918-1990 (1991); NIGEL FosTER, GERmAN LAW & LEGAL SYSTEM 27 (1993).
238. See, e.g., Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex III-IV (creating the necessary
preconditions to hold elections in Bosnia and create a new constitution for the Bosnian
Republic).
239. Id. Annex III, art. 2, 1-2.
240. Id. Annex III, art. 2, Cl 1, sub. c.
241. Id. Annex X, art. 2, Cl 1, sub. d.
242. Bonn Peace Implementation Conference, Conclusions, art. V, Cl 1, Bonn, Dec. 10
1997 (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ohr.int/docu/d971210a.htm> [hereinafter
Bonn Statement].
243. See supra Part I.
244. See Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex III, art. 3, Cl 2.
245. See Provisional Election Commission, Rules and Regulations, Chapter 9, art. 9.5
(visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.oscebih.org/RulesRegs/chp9.htm>.
246. See id. art. 9.15.
247. See id. art. 9.35.
248. See id. art. 9.100.
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characteristics of an administrative bureaucracy and, through its Subcom-
missions,249 heard complaints and issued decisions. 250
The second font of power involves the authority of the military to
accomplish its missions and to protect itself.251 This power stems from
Annex 1-A and other portions of the Dayton Accords and is in some sense
self-evident. However, its apparent simplicity masks difficult questions
surrounding the authority of individuals and groups to take specific
actions in Bosnia. In some instances NATO troops acted as a result of mili-
tary command decisions.252 NATO troops were not subject to the direct
authority of the High Representative, though the OHR had coordinating
responsibilities. 253 For example, the decision in 1997 to return the
Udigrovo Tower to SRT Pale was made by Sfor and not by the High Repre-
sentative.254 Here, too, however, the High Representative gained authority
to intervene in Bosnia's media regime because of his relationship to the
military. He could request that Sfor take actions to enforce OHR or OSCE
sanctions, but Sfor was not required to implement any OHR directives. 255
The third font of power is the broadest. It stems from the executive
power of the OHR itself and overlaps with the other two fonts of power.25 6
The Accords granted few specific powers to the OHR and, as a conse-
quence, the OHR's powers sometimes grew organically, due to broad inter-
pretations of the Accords mandated by the circumstances on the
ground. 257
With respect to the media, however, the OHR emerged as an idealized
"information intervention unit" backed by the support of the international
community. It encapsulated the contradictions, the constitutional dramas,
and the question of standards in determining what actions to take with
respect to the media.258 The OHR became the receptacle for international
hopes.259
In the Bonn Statement, the PIC "reiterate[d] its firm commitment to
establish free and pluralistic media throughout Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. ''260 More importantly, it "supported] the High Representative's over-
all media and telecommunications strategy."261 This broad focus on the
OHR as manager of the Bosnian media strategy emerged from the Sintra
Declaration. 262 The Contact Committee, the six-country coordinating
249. See id. art. 9.115.
250. See id. arts. 9.130-9.155.
251. See Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex I-A, art. IV, 1 5.
252. See supra Part I.
253. See Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex I-A, art. I, sub. b.
254. See Serbs Sever Links with International Envoy, Sept. 12, 1997, available in LEXIS,
ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
255. See Dayton Accords, supra note 36, Annex I-A, sub. b.
256. See id. Annex X, art. II.
257. See, e.g., id. Annex X, arts. I-I (outlining the powers of the OHR).
258. See supra Part I.
259. See id.
260. Bonn Statement, supra note 242, 1 1.
261. See id.
262. See Sintra Declaration, supra note 105, '1 70.
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committee of NATO powers, expressed confidence in the OHR and its role
in regulating media in Bosnia in the Sintra Declaration.2 63 The Declara-
tion is an example of the formulation of law as a post hoc clarification of
power and extension of authority necessitated by circumstances on the
ground.
The Sintra Declaration's grant of media intervention power to the OHR
is quite extraordinary, both in terms of the standard for intervention and
the remedies it authorized. The Declaration recognized that standard rem-
edies such as fines, warnings, or even corrective broadcasts - the OSCE's
remedies in the election context - may not be sufficient in other circum-
stances. Sintra consequently authorized the OHR to curtail, suspend, and
close down media networks or programs. 264 These were dramatic reme-
dies but they were remedies that the OHR and NATO had already
employed.265 The Sintra Declaration authorized not only punitive sanc-
tions, but also expanded the OHR's capacity to develop a new architecture
of media regulation.266
C. Standards for Exercising Authority
For the rule of law to have meaning in the context of information interven-
tion there must be clearly articulated standards and mechanisms to inter-
pret and apply those standards fairly.267 This generalization about
administrative justice is particularly applicable to the Sintra standard,
which allowed the OHR to curtail media actors engaging in "persistent and
blatant contravention of either the letter or the spirit of the Peace Agree-
ment."268 Because only primitive media regulatory machinery (the MSAG,
at most) existed,269 there was no process for the OHR or the military to
determine whether a particular act violated the standard. There was no
process of review, nor any opportunity for SRT Pale to have a formal hear-
ing to determine whether its actions violated the Sintra standard or
whether the OHR's sanctions were appropriate given SRT's actions. The
lack of a formalized process may have been necessary given the complexity
of the media situation in Bosnia. On the other hand, post-Sintra events
indicate that a standard in fact evolved to guide the SRT's actions in Bosnia.
Frequent statements by the OHR provide some sense of how the OHR
read the Sintra Declaration.270 Here, too, an important distinction should
263. See Contact Group Statement (visited April 4, 1999) <http://www.ohr.int/docu/
d970904a.htm>.
264. See Sintra Declaration, supra note 105, 1 70.
265. See supra Part I.
266. See Sintra Declaration, supra note 105, 68.
267. See generally LON FULLER, THE MoRALIrY OF LAw 33-44 (1969) (describing the
story of a King Rex and his eight failed attempts at making law).
268. Sintra Declaration, supra note 105, 70.
269. Media Group Worried About Bosnian Serb, Croat T.V. Editorial Policies, Beta New
Agency, Sept. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
270. See Statements by the High Representative (May 22, 1997) <http://www.ohr.int/
1997/stat97.htm>; see also Statements by Mr. Carlos Westendorp (Oct. 27, 1997) <http:/
/www.ohr.int/1997/stat97.htm>.
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be made. The PEC, as administered by the OSCE, established and
announced a mechanism that allowed the Media Experts Commission to
develop, clarify, and apply the code.271 Under the Sintra Declaration, on
the other hand, there was a kind of common law development: the OHR or
its spokesperson articulated standards that changed in indefinite ways.
While the MSAG existed as an advisory group, it did not have the delibera-
tive authority of the Media Elections Commission.272 Penalizing actors for
"persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or the letter of the
Peace Agreement"273 is a fairly open standard subject to the exercise of
enormous discretion.
For example, the OHR viewed the seizure of four transmitters on Octo-
ber 2, 1997 as necessary following "the grotesque distortion of the press
conference with Judge Louise Arbour" by SRT Pale.274 Additionally, "[t]he
distortion of the interview with Judge Arbour, a distinguished international
judge, was the last straw" in a long catalogue of flagrant breaches by SRT
Pale of agreements reached between it and the international community. 275
The remedy of seizure was appropriate because SRT's broadcast apology,
even though it predated the seizure, "was, although welcome, frankly too
little, too late."276 Military action in response to another breach was inevi-
table, especially in light of the final warning issued by the OHR and Gen-
eral Shinseki in a letter to SRT Pale on September 10, 1997.277
The OHR also justified its action by referring to the Belgrade Agree-
ment.2 78 In the Belgrade Agreement, President Plavsic and President
Krajisnik "agree[d] that the unified media environment of the Republika
Srpska and free access to media by all participants in elections [was] vital
for their being held in a democratic manner," and that "news programmes
[should] be broadcast daily from studios in Pale and Banja Luka
alternately. 279
The Belgrade Agreement was important but not necessarily useful to
justify the Sfor October seizure of SRT Pale's transmitters. SRT Pale may
have distorted the presentation of Judge Arbour, but that did not violate the
provisions of the agreement calling for SRT studios in Pale and Banja Luka
to alternate their broadcasts. 280 Those provisions were designed to insure
that neither Pale nor Banja Luka monopolized the Bosnian Serb informa-
tion space. However, the Udrigovo Agreement provided a more likely
271. See supra note 244.
272. See Defense Department Holds Regular Briefing, supra note 269.
273. Sintra Declaration, supra note 105, c 70.
274. NATO/Sfor Joint Press Conference, M2 Presswire, Oct. 3, 1997, available in
LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB. File.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See Draft Paper by the High Representative, Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina -
The Way Forward, Oct. 6, 1997, 1 2 (on file with author).
278. See SRT Pale Studio to Opt Out of Alternate Broadcasting Deal, Tanjug News
Agency, Oct. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
279. Belgrade Agreement, supra note 151, 1 3.
280. See id.
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source of justification for the October seizure. 281 The Udrigovo Agreement
was extremely important because it articulated specific standards to guide
the actions of SRT Pale.2 8 2
In an October draft memorandum, the OHR also stated that it
"intend[ed] to break the control of the SDS and those agents of the hard-
line regime in Pale which are-using the media, together with the police
force, as the main tool to manipulate and control the [Republika Srpskal
people."28 3 This was a separate and new standard for intervention that
enabled the OHR to stop those practices of SRT Pale that "manipulateld]
and control[led] the [Republika Srpskal people."2 84 As a result, the OHR
required "the removal of all direct party political influence" from SRT Pale
and the transformation of the network into a station that "operates in a
fashion that is consistent with Western democratic standards and in
accordance with'the spirit and letter of the Dayton Agreement" before
returning the transmitters back to the Pale leadership. 28 5 This intervention
took place not because of conflict between different ethnic groups but
because of conflict between two factions of one ethnic group-Serbs from
Pale and Serbs from Banja Luka.2 8 6 In a sense, this was an election-related
seizure of control, not a seizure directly related to ethnic conflict.
Because the standard for intervention articulated in the Sintra Declara-
tion was so broad, it is difficult to determine when radical intervention-
beyond monitoring-was justified. In examining the evolution of the stan-
281. See Udrigovo Agreement, supra note 129.
282. See id. (stating that the turnover of the transmitters to SRT Pale would occur
when SRT Pale met four conditions). These conditions were:
1. RS [Republika Srpska] media, TV, radio, and print will refrain from making
inflammatory reporting against SFOR and international organizations support-
ing the execution of the Dayton Accord.
2. RS TV will regularly provide one hour of programming during prime time
each day without exception, during which other political views will be aired.
3. RS TV will provide Ambassador Westendorp 1/2 hour during prime time in
the next few days to introduce himself and explain the events which took place
in Brcko, Bijelina, and Banja Luka. Such time will be unedited and not com-
mented on in advance or after airing by RS TV commentators.
4. RS agrees to participate in a full and consistent manner in a Media Support
Advisory Group conducted by OHR to discuss and regulate the work of the
media in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the GFAP.
Id.
Only the first of these clauses could have justified the OHR seizure of additional
transmitters.
283. Draft Paper by the High Representative, supra note 277, '1 5, sub. ii.
284. Id.
285. Id. 1 7.
286. On October 17, the Contact Group reaffirmed the OHR's action and stated that
SRT Pale must follow these steps:
[T]he governing board of SRT must be restructured, with a new general man-
ager; during the election campaign ... there should be fair, regulated access to
the media by RS political parties supervised by the OHR to ensure proper prac-
tice; rules of conduct should be drawn up for journalists and for the manage-
ment of the media in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Contact Group "Conclusions" on Serb Media, BBCSWB, Oct. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS,
ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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dard in subsequent statements, it became clear that the standard of objec-
tive and impartial reporting and the standard that justified the imposition
of an international protectorate on SRT Pale shifted. Broadcasts that per-
sistently and blatantly contravented Dayton became a new basis for OHR
intervention in Bosnia.287 While this justification did not deal with incite-
ment to ethnic violence, the OHR considered contravention of Dayton to be
a per se increase in the likelihood of ethnic conflict. The standard for
ongoing behavior was presented as consensual and emerged from the par-
ties to the potential conflict, not as a law of standards imposed by the inter-
national community itself. It was also clear that "contravention of the
spirit of the agreement" was found when the Sfor's authority was thought
to be undermined,2s8 or the media questioned the integrity of the Peace
Process in ways considered inflammatory.289
D. Comprehensive Media Reform
The OHR may have recognized its failure to provide clear and consistent
guidelines to the media actors in Bosnia when it decided to comprehen-
sively reform the entire media regulatory regime in Bosnia. 290 It created an
entire framework with objective standards and a mechanism to determine
whether a media violation occurred and the proper sanction for each viola-
tion.291 In terms of intervention, such a reform might be far more radical
than isolated transmitter seizures. The seizures were episodic responses to
unique and specific circumstances. 292 The reform, in contrast, sought to
put into place a new legal system with tribunals, enforcement mechanisms,
and licensing agencies. 293 It attempted to reshape the entire broadcasting
system in Bosnia.
Unfortunately, "the control of the media by individual political par-
ties," an obstacle that "bedevil[ed] ... efforts to re-establish civil society in
Bosnia," served to hamper the OHR's reforms. 29 4 The OHR needed to
reconstruct a fundamentally altered media that was neither "ethnically
based" nor "directly or indirectly associated to the main mono-ethnic polit-
ical parties."295 Ethnically-based media had resulted in "enmities which
precipitated the war [being] fought out over the airwaves. '296 Reforming
287. See, e.g., Sintra Declaration, supra note 107, c/ 70 ("[Tihe High Representative
has the right to curtail or suspend any media network or programme whose output is in
persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Peace
Agreement.").
288. See Draft Paper by High Representative, supra note 277.
289. See supra Part I.
290. See Bonn Statement, supra note 242, art. V, '1 2.
291. See Philip Shenon, Allies Creating Press-Control Agency in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 1998, at A8.
292. See supra Part I.
293. See Decision of the HR Independent Media Commission, Sarajevo, June 11, 1998
(visited April 5, 1999) <http://www.ohr.int/mediares/d980611a.htm>.
294. Draft Paper by the High Representative, supra note 277, 1 3.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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"the whole media landscape in [Bosnia-Herzegovina was] a vital prerequi-
site for progress in the implementation of Dayton."29
7
In terms of this element of intervention, the OHR statements provide a
sense of the aims of the international community and the aims of the par-
ties to the Dayton Accords. According to one document, the aims of the
OHR included:
[E]stablishing, country-wide, a regulatory regime equating to models operating
in other democratic, plural societies. This will be responsible for establishing
and enforcing arrangements for fair and equitable access to the electronic
media for the full range of opinion. This will be a transitional arrangement,
and will remain in place until the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] common institutions
establish a satisfactory regulatory regime to replace it under the Media Law,
now under consideration. (italics in original)29 8
With respect to the wholesale reform, the OHR wanted to create a "sin-
gle regulatory body," chaired by an international judge and composed of
representatives of the principal international agencies. 29 9 This body was
granted the power to recommend sanctions (to be implemented by the
MSAG) and to issue and withdraw licenses for all existing broadcasting
entities.300 The concept of wholesale reform was set forth in further detail
by the OHR in early 1998 when the international community sought assist-
ance in implementing the Bosnian media reform package.3 0 1
The OHR announced that it wanted to build an Intermediate Media
Standards and Licensing Commission with the power to regulate all media
in Bosnia. 30 2 This Commission was to absorb the election-related func-
tions of the Media Experts Commission 30 3 and would require all broad-
casters to meet a set of "internationally recognized standards of
broadcasting" in order to obtain a license.30 4 The OHR expected to create
a judicial body with "powers of sanction to ensure compliance" with the
297. Id. One question is whether the "information structures" belong to the "entities"
under the Dayton Accords or whether the national government can or should be an
umbrella broadcaster. See, e.g., Croats Accuse National TV of Being Partisan (TV Bosnia-
Hercegovina broadcast. Mar. 31, 1998), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB
File (discussing the Croat response to the possible creation of a Bosnian umbrella broad-
cast agency). On this issue the media and publishing department of Herceg-Bosna criti-
cized Bosnia-Herzegovina television on the grounds that "[ilt is inadmissible and
intolerable that in a federal entity one party, one nation has absolute political and all
other monopoly over the media, which are called state media." Id. The Croats called on
"international officials" to "finally halt the media war and transform this television, in
line with the needs of all constituent nations in Bosnia-Hercegovina." Id.
298. Draft Paper by the High Representative, supra note 277, 1 3.
299. See id. 7 6.
300. See id. (declaring that the Commission would issue licenses to broadcasters
"according to a set of internationally recognized rules and subject to them respecting a
set of minimum of basic restructuring criteria.").
301. See Bonn Statement, supra note 242, art. V., c 2(b).
302. See Shenon, supra note 296.
303. See Bonn Statement, supra note 242, art. V, c' 2(a) (referring to the creation of an
Independent Media Standards and Licensing Commission, subsequently entitled the
Intermediate Media Standards and Licensing Commission).
304. Id.
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rulings of the Commission. 30 5 International experts and Bosnian repre-
sentatives from both the Federation and Republika Srpska would staff the
Commission.30 6
This new reform was based on a December 1997 proposal to the
OHR. 30 7 According to this proposal, the Intermediate Commission would
remain in operation until institutions that could perform the functions of
the Intermediate Commission were in place at the national entity or canton
levels.308 The proposal justified this comprehensive action because "mon-
olithic control allowed broadcasting in Bosnia to be used as a means to
divide the ethnic communities." 30 9 Not only was it true that "the distribu-
tion of poisonous propaganda was a major contributor to the war," but "it
is still used to indoctrinate the communities."3 10 The OHR considered the
Commission and comprehensive legal reform necessary to avoid a situa-
tion where the media "emphasiz[ed] separatism" and thus "h[eld] back the
peace process."3 1 1
Since the OHR felt that the systemic and structural problems of the
existing media model in Bosnia were so pervasive, it observed that restruc-
turing all media, particularly broadcast media, in accordance with interna-
tionally accepted standards was the only way to achieve "pluralism and
inter-entity broadcasting."3 12 The new system would include "codes of
conduct for program content," modeled on "the established practice[s] in
Western European democracies and in North America." 3 13 The proposal
provided that these codes would also apply to the press and the
Internet.3 14 Until state agencies were established (and approved), the
Intermediate Commission would establish, regulate, and enforce the
Codes.315
The Commission was to have three divisions. 31 6 The first division was
an "all-media" complaints commission.3 17 It would affirmatively monitor
the press and broadcast media, investigate complaints regarding violations
of the codes of practice, and recommend action on those complaints it
found valid.3 18 The second division was a licensing sub-commission that
would "establish" and administer structural and editorial licensing stan-
305. Proposal to the Peace Implementation Conference, Bonn, Dec. 9, 1997, at 2 (on
file with author) [hereinafter Proposal].
306. See id. at 1.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 2.
309. Id. at 1.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 4, pt. C.
314. See id.
315. See Commission Seeks to Put Order in Bosnian Broadcasting, AGENCE FRNcE
PESSE, May 8, 1998, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
316. See Proposal, supra note 305, at 2.
317. See id.
318. See id.
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dards.3 19 All broadcasters seeking a license would have to conform to the
licensing commission's standards.3 20 The third division was an interven-
tion tribunal that would rule on disciplinary procedures and provide sanc-
tions and penalties when appropriate.3 2 1
The tribunal would have the authority to require "one or more on-
screen apologies," or "one or more apologies to be published in the press
and on radio."3 22 It could prohibit rebroadcast of an "offending pro-
gramme or its content" and temporarily withdraw a license for access to
the transmission system.32 3 Additionally, it was empowered to curtail a
license or revoke a license entirely. 324 Finally, it had the power to impose
financial penalties on either the station or the directors or principals of the
station regardless of whether the station was owned by the government. 3 25
III. Bosnia and the Idea of Information Intervention
The literature of "information intervention" is thinner than its practice.
Jamie Metzl coined the term in a 1997 essay and called for the development
of an information intervention unit at the international level that would
monitor, counter, and block radio and television broadcasts that incite
wvidespread violence in crisis zones around the world.32 6 Metzl declared
that the United Nations should empower the unit to engage in "peace
broadcasting" and "jamming" in the event that an information crisis
erupts. 32 7 The transmitter seizure in Bosnia indicates that Metzl's list of
possible information intervention tools may not be exhaustive. Addition-
ally, there are complex factors that any policy maker must take into
account when deciding whether to use any of these tools as part of a gen-
eral information strategy.
The most basic questions involve monitoring. Metzl thought that the
international community should monitor broadcasts before taking other
steps.3 28 He considered media monitoring a form of anticipatory intelli-
gence.3 29 At the present time, there is active monitoring of the world's
media, though not on a collective international basis. The B.B.C. and the
U.S. State Department (through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Ser-
vice) survey and review electronic media.3 30 In the Bosnian context, the
OSCE and its Media Experts Commission monitored Bosnian broadcasts to
determine whether the Bosnian media abided by the OSCE's election
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. Id. at 3.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 17.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 18.
329. See id. at 17.
330. See Broadcast Review of 1997, MONITOmNG RESEAR H, Dec. 16, 1997, available in
LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File.
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rules.33 1 Additionally, the OHR monitored SRT broadcasts to determine
whether SRT complied with the OHR's demands for corrective broad-
casts. 332 The OHR also proposed that the Intermediate Commission have
the power to monitor Bosnian broadcasts.333
Even monitoring presents some human rights issues. Broadcasting is,
by definition, a public act,3 34 So that on the surface, there should be little
difficulty in monitoring an entity's broadcasts. The systematic monitoring
of world broadcasts by the BBC and the Foreign Broadcasting Information
Service (FBIS) generally is not monitoring with the purpose of interven-
tion. Rather, these entities gather intelligence for policy-making pur-
poses.335 Monitoring may become problematic when the effective media is
private. For example, monitoring encrypted web sites or closed list web
sites presents significant privacy and free speech issues. 336 Monitoring in
such circumstances may become more complex and intrusive.337 The pro-
posed Intermediate Commission in Bosnia included Internet communica-
tions within its sweep of supervision.338 The apparent innocuousness of
monitoring may turn on the nature of the agency that engages in it, but the
international community needs to develop concrete standards to help any
agency determine when such action is appropriate.
The second element-alternative or "peace broadcasting"- was evi-
dent, but not always successful in Bosnia. Peace broadcasting has many
elements. Intervention to provide "more speech" is generally acceptable
and widely applauded by guardians of the press and citizenship. 339
Acclaim, however, may be limited when those in power use peace broad-
casting to force an entity to broadcast corrective statements or explanations
of official positions. This type of information intervention took place in
Bosnia.340 The purpose, however, of the OHR's use of this intervention
was to provide alternate voices to SRT Pale.341
The Bosnian case suggests further distinctions among efforts at peace
broadcasting. In Bosnia, the international community established an alter-
native broadcast network and stitched together a network of existing
independent stations to create an alternative to SRT Pale.342 By reinforcing
331. See supra Part I.
332. See id.
333. See Bonn Statement, supra note 242, art. V, cl 2(a).
334. See, e.g., WEBsTi's THiRD NEw INTERNATnONAL DIcnONARY 280 (1993) (defining
broadcast to include "the act of making widely known" and "made public by means of
radio or television transmission") (emphasis added).
335. See Broadcast Review of 1997, supra note 330.
336. See, e.g., id. (describing the Internet monitoring efforts of various news
services).
337. See id.
338. See Proposal, supra note 305, at 2, 1.
339. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Propo-
sal, 1990 DuKE LJ. 484, 484 (1990) (declaring that the antidote for hate speech is free
speech "and more free speech!").
340. See supra Part I.
341. See id.
342. See, e.g., OSCE Official on Support for Independent Media (World Broadcast Infor-
mation, Jan. 3, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File (stating that
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media independent of hard line voices, the international community
ensures that views in accord with a plural and constitutional future are
broadcast to the state in question. Finally, the Bosnian experience raises
questions about the use of foreign governmental funds in creating alternate
voices.343 Many argue that support only goes to those portions of the
press that are inclined favorably to the donor's point of view.344
Other issues are more specific. For example, should the international
community have provided more assistance to Bosnian public service broad-
casters? Dr. Reino Paasilinna, a media policy scholar and Member of the
European Parliament for Finland, attacked the OHR for supporting com-
mercial broadcasting at the expense of public service radio and television
in Bosnia.345 Dr. Paasalinna also criticized the international community
for expending millions of dollars to create and support the OBN as a com-
mercial competitor of TVBiH. 346
On the information intervention scale, jamming represents a more
severe form of intervention as compared to monitoring or peace broadcast-
ing.3 47 On the other hand, the international legal principles that would or
would not authorize jamming may be quite different than those that deal
with the seizure of transmitters or other steps to curtail or preclude broad-
casts. 348 The Bosnian experience demonstrates the controversy and diffi-
culty of jamming even when legally justified. Sfor and the OHR were
subject to great criticism in their home countries for jamming SRT Pale
broadcasts. As the SRT and HTV Mostar experiences indicate, however, an
information intervention unit of the future would likely jam broadcasts by
Radio FERN and the Open Broadcast Network were established "to enable political par-
ties and candidates to present themselves throughout the entire territory of Bosnia-
Hercegovina before the elections.").
343. See Broadcast Review of 1997, supra note 330. In January 1998, the European
Commission representative to Bosnia-Hercegovina signed 18 contracts in which the EU
provided about 2.4 million Ecus to support independent media organizations in Bosnia
and Hercegovina. Independent Media in Bosnia to Get 2.4m ECU From EU (European
Commission Spokesman Service, Jan. 22, 1998), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library,
BBCSWB File. According to the official press release, assistance goes to those entities
that "foster understanding, trust and cooperation between the different communities in
[Bosnia-Herzegovina]." Id. The EU also supported RTBBiH because it "considers it
more pluralist than the public televisions in other countries undergoing similar periods
of transition." Id. The EU also favored projects that allowed media to extend their signal
to the whole country. See id.
344. See, e.g., Plavsic Favours Banja Luka/Pale Alternate Broadcasts (Bosnian Serb Tele-
vision broadcast, Oct. 24, 1997), available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File
(defending the actions of the international community against charges that it was
unfairly favoring SRT Banja Luka).
345. See MEP Attacks Commission for Neglecting Public Broadcaster in Bosnia, M2
Pressvire, Oct. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, ALLWRD Library, BBCSWB File ("Democ-
ratization in the media cannot be guaranteed by letting the market have its way, by
supporting a private network... and neglecting the public sector.").
346. See id.
347. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 18. For definitions of the term jamming, see supra
note 19.
348. See, e.g., Jamie F. Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the Law of Jamming, 91 AM. J.
Iirr'L L. 628, 636 (1997) (detailing the international law precedents that guide the law of
jamming).
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affecting transmission paths rather than physically interfering with the
facilities of an offending station.
There is one element of information intervention not apparent in the
literature that was critical in the Bosnian context. In Bosnia, the interna-
tional community reconstructed the media regime and relicensed all
existing broadcasters. Ultimately, legal reform plays a key part in legitimiz-
ing change and, perhaps, in facilitating change. Law becomes the vehicle
for articulating goals and establishing the machinery for meeting those
goals. In Bosnia, the OHR found it necessary to develop a framework that
was dear, transparent, and available to all the actors in the region in order
to create a pluralistic media.34 9
The Bosnian experience also demonstrates that information interven-
tion, like any aspect of international intervention, is a complex managerial
undertaking that involves meshing the needs of conflicting international
agencies and non-government organizations with the needs of the state and
the various entities that comprise the state. It requires that the interna-
tional community establish a bureaucracy that (1) can determine under
what conditions an intervention is needed and (2) can designate and fulfill
the intervention. The Bosnian experience demonstrated that such a
bureaucracy needs individuals prepared to deal with the technical aspect of
intervention to make sure that the intervention is not circumvented. 35 0
Conclusion
The restructuring of the Bosnian media helps us understand the context,
limitations, and techniques of information intervention. It illustrates how
the international community struggles to define and implement interven-
tion policy and developes justifications for initiating an intervention or
increasing the scope of existing interventions. The Bosnian experience
also suggests that the parties implementing the Dayton Accords lurched
towards definitions and standards in the process of forming an interven-
tion strategy. The resulting standards were often shaped by ethnocentric
criticism of international officials or media policies, and thus may increase
the likelihood of violence in a post-conflict context. The Bosnian episode
also underscores the limited machinery that exists to provide official
accountability for those officials in charge of an intervention.
Because so many of the techniques of information intervention were
applied in Bosnia, the Bosnian experience provides a unique perspective
into the relationship between the intervenors and the domestic media. The
international community took steps that ranged from the training of media
professionals to the military seizure of transmitters. The comprehensive-
ness of those events provides a textbook opportunity to analyze the rele-
vance of international law norms to information intervention. Other
norms, such as U.S. First Amendment principles, might be used as guide-
lines particularly where American actions are implicated. However, it
349. See supra Part II.
350. See supra Part I.
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would be too easy to jump from the peacetime application of such norms
within the United States to their applicability abroad in time of conflict.
When not reinterpreted, even the most specific subcategories of First
Amendment jurisprudence ring hollow when applied to a zone of interna-
tional concern. Is advocacy of imminent lawless action in a troubled area
enough to justify an information intervention?351 Is the use of fighting
words enough to justify an information intervention?352 When do these
types of speech pose a "clear and present danger" to the international com-
munity such that an information intervention is justified?35 3 Must all
information interventions be "narrowly-tailored" and "content neutral" to
fit within the discourse of international information intervention?35 4 Doc-
trines derived from the European Convention on Human Rights also must
be taken into account in shaping policy.3 55 Further, examining the imple-
mentation of the Dayton Accords is instructive because it sheds light on
how the international community makes decisions regarding the scope of
such concepts as objectivity, impartiality, avoiding ethnic conflict, and
enhancing the right to receive and impart information.
The international mission, as U.S. and Western representatives saw it,
was to reconstruct a viable multi-ethnic media, as well as to prevent further
conflict.3 5 6 NATO was seeking to build, under the Dayton Accords, a plu-
ral society out of pieces that seemed fractured beyond repair. The OHR
believed that a pluralistic, peaceful media was an indispensable part of the
rebuilding process.357 The Office proclaimed its desire to "use the oppor-
tunity to remove one of the most serious obstacles bedeviling our efforts to
re-establish civil society in Bosnia" - the fact that the media was ethnically
based.358 NATO and OHR actions must be judged after a reasonable
period of time elapses to see if a more democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, sup-
351. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that advocacy of
imminent lawless action that is likely to incite or produce such action is not protected
speech under the First Amendment); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (declaring that the most "stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded theatre and causing a panic").
352. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that speech
directed at or producing an immediate substantial evil is not protected speech under the
First Amendment).
353. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 ("The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.") (emphasis added).
354. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding that a
government imposed time, place, or manner restriction on the exercise of free speech in
a public forum could be justified if the restriction was "narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate content-neutral interests") (emphasis added).
355. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 5 2, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 (restricting the right of
freedom of expression in instances "necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime").-
356. See supra Part I.
357. Id.
358. Draft Paper by the High Representative, supra note 277, at 113.
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ported by the pluralism that comes from a free and independent press,
emerges. Still, one of the great dangers of information intervention is that
it provides apparent democratic justification for any nation to use its police
power to close down media outlets. Each time the international commu-
nity intervenes to shut down a media outlet that it does not like, the line
between information intervention and censorship becomes blurred. The
real test is not only whether an information intervention transforms a soci-
ety but also whether the intervention comports with the spirit of demo-
cratic change. Ends can justify means, but it is helpful if the means
themselves are compatible with those ends.
As with many complex undertakings, much criticism has attached to
the idea that the post-conflict situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was marked
by chaos, too many actors, mixed objectives, and circumstances in which
each country wanted its own signature of representation, even if that was
inconsistent with a rationale whole. The OHR was also criticized for being
too dictatorial, too directed, and inadequately responsive. Undoubtedly all
of these criticisms are true to some extent. It is a characteristic of post-
conflict interventions, especially multilateral interventions that involve
both intergovernmental and non-governmental entities, that the perils of
crisis management are present. Evolving political circumstances in the
Balkans, including the maturing of institutions within Bosnia-Herzegovina,
will alter the international community's perception of its role in indigenous
media development. Political transformations in Croatia and, potentially,
Serbia, could have as much influence on post-conflict media intervention
in Bosnia as the direct actions of the OHR and Sfor. The international
community itself may alter its perception of how to structure the relation-
ship between the entities and Bosnia-Herzegovina and this will affect post-
conflict media policy. And in the best of worlds, the building of an
independent media sector and the growth of a comprehensive, increasingly
autonomous public service broadcasting sector will combine to hasten the
likelihood of a mature and stable democratic state.
On March 31, 1998, Sfor handed the seized towers to the newly
elected Bosnian government. Sfor, however, reserved the right to reap-
propriate the transmitters at any time.35 9 On April 14, 1998, the Serb
Republic Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, and Sfor Commander, Eric Shin-
seki, signed a memorandum of understanding in which Sfor agreed to stop
"provid[ing] security protection for TV transmitters belonging to Serb
Radio and TV."3 60 The episode of transmitter seizure was over.
359. See MEP Attacks Commission for Neglecting Public Broadcaster in Bosnia, supra
note 345.
360. Serbs and Sfor Agree to Return Transmitters (Radio St. John, Pale, Apr. 14, 1998),
available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
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